1Well then, as the promise of entrance into his Rest is still left to us, let us be afraid of anyone being judged to have missed it. 2For (καὶ γάρ = etenim) we have had the good news as well as they (ἐκεῖνοι=3:8, 19); only, the message they heard was of no use to them, because it did not meet with faith in the hearers. 3 For we do “enter the Rest” by our faith: according to his word,

“As I swore in my anger,

they shall never enter my Rest”—

although “his works” were all over by the foundation of the world. 4For he says somewhere about the seventh(sc. ἡμέρας) day: “And God rested from all his works on the seventh day.” 5And again in this (ἐν τούτῳ, sc. τόπῳ) passage, “they shall never enter my Rest.” 6Since then it is reserved (ἀπολείπεται, a variant for καταλειπ. v. 1) for some “to enter it,” and since those who formerly got the good news failed to “enter” owing to their disobedience,1 7he again fixes a day; “today”—as he says in “David” after so long an interval, and as has been already quoted:

“Today, when you hear his voice,

harden not your hearts.”

8Thus if Joshua had given them Rest, God would not speak later about another day. There is a sabbath-Rest, then, reserved (ἀπολείπεται, as in 6) still for the People of God (for once “a man enters his (αὐτοῦ, i.e. God’s) rest,” he “rests from work” just as God did).

Ἐπαγγελία (v. 1) is not common in the LXX, though it mistranslates סִפְרָה in Psalm 56:8, and is occasionally the term for a human promise. In the Prayer of Manasseh (6) it is the divine promise (τὸ ἔλεος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας σου), and recurs in the plural, of the divine promises, in Test. Joshua 20:1 (ὁ θεὸς ποιήσει τὴν ἐκδίκησιν ὑμῶν καὶ ἐπάξει ὑμᾶς εἰς τὰς ἐπαγγελίας τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν) and Ps. Sol 12:8 (ὅσιοι κυρίου κληρονομήσαιεν ἐπαγγελίας κυρίου—the first occurrence of this phrase κλ. ἐπ., cp. below on 6:12). Καταλειπομένης ἐπαγγελίας (+ τῆς D* 255, from 6:15, 17, 11:9) is a genitive absolute. Ἐπαγγελίας εἰσελθεῖν (like ὁρμὴ … ὑβρίσαι in Acts 14:5) κτλ: the basis of the appeal is (a) that the divine promise of Rest has been neither fulfilled nor withdrawn (still τὸ “σήμερον” καλεῖται); and (b) that the punishment which befalls others is a warning to ourselves (cp. Philo, ad Gaium, 1: αἱ γὰρ ἑτέρων τιμωρίαι βελτοιῦσι τοὺς πολλούς, φόβῳ τοῦ μὴ παραπλήσια παθεῖν). By a well-known literary device μή ποτε, like μή in 12:15, takes a present (δοκῇ), instead of the more usual aorist, subjunctive. Δοκῇ means “judged” or “adjudged,” as in Josephus, Ant. viii. 32, κἂν ἀλλότριον δοκῇ. This is common in the LXX, e.g. in Proverbs 17:28 ἐνεὸν δέ τις ἑαυτὸν ποιήσας δόξει φρόνιμος εἶναι (where δόξει is paralleled by λογισθήσεται), 27:14 (καταρωμένου οὐδὲν διαφέρειν δόξει); indeed it is an ordinary Attic use which goes back to Plato (e.g. Phaedo, 113 D, of the souls in the underworld, οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι) and Demosthenes (629. 17, οἱ δεδογμένοι ἀνδροφόνοι = the convicted murderers). The searching scrutiny which passes this verdict upon lack of faith is the work of the divine Logos (in v. 12).

In v. 2 εὐηγγελισμένοι is remarkable. Our author, who never uses εὐαγγέλιον (preferring ἐπαγγελία here as an equivalent), employs the passive of εὐαγγελίζειν1 (as in v. 6) in the broad sense of “having good news brought to one.” The passive occurs in LXX of 2 S 18:31 (εὐαγγελισθήτω ὁ κύριός ὁ βασιλεύς) and in Matthew 11:5 (πτωχοὶ εὐαγγελίζονται). The καί after καθάπερ emphasizes as usual the idea of correspondence. The reason for the failure of the past generation was that they merely heard what God said, and did not believe him; ὁ λόγος τῆς ἀκοῆς (ἀκοῆς, passive = “sermo auditus,” vg), which is another (see 3:12) instance of the Semitic genitive of quality, is defined as μή (causal particle as in 11:27 μὴ φοβηθείς) συγκεκ(ε)ρα(ς)μένος τῇ πίστει τοῖς ἀκούσασιν, since it did not get blended with faith in (the case of) those who heard it. Or τῇ πίστει may be an instrumental dative: “since it did not enter vitally into the hearers by means of the faith which it normally awakens in men.” The fault lies, as in the parable of the Sower, not with the message but with the hearers. The phrase λόγος … συγκεκρασμένος may be illustrated from Menander (Stob. Serm. 42, p. 302), τὴν τοῦ λόγου μὲν δύναμιν οὐκ ἐπίφθονον ἤθει δὲ χρηστῷ συγκεκραμένην ἔχειν, and Plutarch, non posse suauiter vivi secundum Epicurum, 1101, βέλτιον γὰρ ἐνυπάρχειν τι καὶ συγκεκρᾶσθαι τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξῃ κοινὸν αἰδοῦς καὶ φόβου πάθος κτλ. The use of λόγος with such verbs is illustrated by Plutarch, Vit. Cleom. 2 (ὁ δὲ Στωικὸς λόγος … βάθει δὲ καὶ πράῳ κεραννύμενος ἤθει μάλιστα εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγαθὸν ἐπιδίδωσιν). Κρᾶσις occurs in Philo’s definition of φιλία (Quaest. in Genesis 2:18) as consisting [οὐκ] ἐν τῷ χρειώδει μᾶλλον ἢ κράσει καὶ συμφωνίᾳ βεβαίῳ τῶν ἠθῶν, and συγκεκρᾶσθαι in his description of the union of spirit and blood in the human body (Quaest. in Genesis 9:4 πνεῦμα … ἐμφέρεσθαι καὶ συγκεκρᾶσθαι αἵματι).

The original reading συγκεκ(ε)ρα(ς)μένος (א 114 vt pesh Lucif.) was soon assimilated (after ἐκείνους) into the accusative -ους (p13 A B C D K L M P vg boh syrhkl etc. Chrys. Theod.-Mops. Aug.), and this led to the alteration of τοῖς ἀκούσασιν into τῶν ἀκουσάντων (D* 104. 1611. 2005 d syrhkl mg Lucif.), or τοῖς ἀκουσθεῖσιν (1912 vg Theod. -Mops.), or τοῖς ἀκούουσιν (1891). The absence of any allusion elsewhere to the faithful minority (Caleb, Joshua) tells decisively against συγκεκρασμένονς (“since they did not mix with the believing hearers”); for the writer (see above) never takes them into account, and, to make any sense, this reading implies them. How could the majority be blamed for not associating with believing hearers when ex hypothesi there were none such?

The writer now (vv. 3-10) lays emphasis upon the reality of the Rest. “We have had this good news too as well as they,” for (γάρ) we believers do enter into God’s Rest; it is prepared and open, it has been ready ever since the world began—ἄρα ἀπολείπεται σαββατισμὸς τῷ λαῷ τοῦ θεοῦ. Εἰσερχόμεθα is the emphatic word in v. 3: “we do (we are sure to) enter,” the futuristic present (“ingrediemur,” vg). When God excluded that unbelieving generation from his Rest, he was already himself in his Rest. The κατάπαυσις was already in existence; the reason why these men did not gain entrance was their own unbelief, not any failure on God’s part to have the Rest ready. Long ago it had been brought into being (this is the force of καίτοι in v. 3), for what prevents it from being realized is not that any ἔργα of God require still to be done. Κατάπαυσις is the sequel to ἔργα. The creative ἔργα leading up to this κατάπαυσις have been completed centuries ago; God enjoys his κατάπαυσις, and if his People do not, the fault lies with themselves, with man’s disbelief.

Here, as in Romans 3:28, there is a choice of reading between οὖν (א A C M 1908 boh) and γάρ (p13 B D K L P Ψ 6, 33 lat syrhkl eth Chrys. Lucif. etc.); the colourless δέ (syrpesh arm) may be neglected. The context is decisive in favour of γάρ. Probably the misinterpretation which produced οὖν led to the change of εἰσερχόμεθα into εἰσερχώμεθα1 (A C 33. 69*: future in vg sah boh Lucif.). The insertion of τήν (the first) may be due to the same interpretation, but not necessarily; p13 B D* om., but B omits the article sometimes without cause (e.g. 7:15). The omission of εἰ (p13 D* 2, 330, 440, 623, 642, 1288, 1319, 1912) was due to the following εἰ in εἰσελεύσονται.

Καίτοι (with gen. absol., as OP 898:26) is equivalent here to καίτοιγε for which it is a v.l. in Acts 17:27 (A E, with ptc.). “Καίτοι, ut antiquiores καίπερ, passim cum participio iungunt scriptores aetatis hellenisticae” (Herwerden, Appendix Lexici Graeci, 249). Καταβολή is not a LXX term, but appears in Ep. Aristeas, 129 and 2 Mac 2:29 (τῆς ὅλης καταβολῆς = the entire edifice); in the NT always, except Hebrews 11:11, in the phrase ἀπό or πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου.

The writer then (v. 4) quotes Genesis 2:2, inserting ὁ θεὸς ἐν (exactly as Philo had done, de poster. Caini, 18), as a proof that the κατάπαυσις had originated immediately after the six days of creation. In εἴρηκε που the που is another literary mannerism (as in Philo); instead of quoting definitely he makes a vague allusion (cp. 2:6). The psalm-threat is then (v. 5) combined with it, and (v. 6) the deduction drawn, that the threat (v. 7) implies a promise (though not as if v. 1 meant, “lest anyone imagine he has come too late for it”—an interpretation as old as Schöttgen, and still advocated, e.g., by Dods).

The title of the 92nd psalm, “for the sabbath-day,” was discussed about the middle of the 2nd century by R. Jehuda and R. Nehemia; the former interpreted it to mean the great Day of the world to come, which was to be one perfect sabbath, but R. Nehemia’s rabbinical tradition preferred to make it the seventh day of creation on which God rested (see W. Bacher’s Agada der Tannaiten2, 1. pp. 328-329). The author of the Epistle of Barnabas (15) sees the fulfilment of Genesis 2:2 in the millennium: “he rested on the seventh day” means that “when his Son arrives he will destroy the time of the lawless one, and condemn the impious, and alter sun and moon and stars; then he will really rest on the seventh day,” and Christians cannot enjoy their rest till then. Our author’s line is different—different even from the Jewish interpretation in the Vita Adae et Evae (li. I), which makes the seventh day symbolize “the resurrection and the rest of the age to come; on the seventh day the Lord rested from all his works.”

In v. 7 μετὰ τοσοῦτον χρόνον, like μετὰ ταῦτα (v. 8), denotes the interval of centuries between the desert and the psalm of David, for ἐν Δαυείδ means “in the psalter” (like ἐν Ἠλίᾳ, Romans 11:2); the 95th psalm is headed αἶνος ᾠδῆς τῷ Δαυείδ in the Greek bible, but the writer throughout (3:7f.) treats it as a direct, divine word. Προείρηται (the author alluding to his previous quotation) is the original text (p13 A C D* P 6, 33, 1611, 1908, 2004, 2005 lat syr Chrys. Cyr. Lucif.); προείρηκεν (B 256, 263, 436, 442, 999, 1739, 1837 arm sah boh Orig.) suggests that God or David spoke these words before the oath (v. 7 comes before v. 11!), while εἴρηται (Dc K L eth etc. Theophyl.) is simply a formula of quotation. From the combination of Psalm 95:7, Psalm 95:8 with Psalm 95:11 and Genesis 2:2 (vv. 3-7) the practical inference is now drawn (v. 8f.). Like Sirach (46:1, 2 κραταιὸς ἐν πολέμοις Ἰησοῦς Ναυή … ὃς ἐγένετο κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ μέγας ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἐκλεκτῶν αὐτοῦ), Philo (de mutatione nominum, 21, Ἰησοῦς δὲ [ἑρμηνεύεται] σωτηρία κυρίου, ἓξεως ὄνομα τῆς ἀρίστης) had commented on the religious significance of the name Joshua; but our author ignores this, and even uses the name Ἰησοῦς freely, since Ἰνσοῦς is never applied by him to Christ before the incarnation (Aquila naturally avoids Ἰησοῦς and prefers Ἰωσουα). The author of Ep. Barnabas plays on the fact that “Joshua” and “Jesus” are the same names: ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ μέλλοντα φανεροῦσθαι ὑμῖν Ἰησοῦν (6:9), i.e. not on the “Jesus” who led Israel into the land of rest, but on the true, divine “Joshua.” Such, he declares, is the inner meaning of Isaiah 28:16 (ὃς ἐλπίσει ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα). But the author of Πρὸς Ἑβραίους takes his own line, starting from the transitive use of καταπαύειν (Joshua 1:13 κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν κατέπαυσεν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἔδωκεν ὑμῖν τὴν γὴν ταύτην, etc.); not that he reads subtle meanings into the transitive and intransitive usages of καταπαύειν, like Philo. Nor does he philosophize upon the relevance of κατάπαυσις to God. Philo, in De Cherubim (26), explains why Moses calls the sabbath (ἑρμηνεύεται δʼ ἀνάπαυσις) the “sabbath of God” in Exodus 20:10 etc.; the only thing which really rests is God—“rest (ἀνάπαυλαν) meaning not inactivity in good (ἀπραξίαν καλῶν)—for the cause of all things which is active by nature never ceases doing what is best, but—an energy devoid of laboriousness, devoid of suffering, and moving with absolute ease.” The movement and changes of creation point to labour, but “what is free from weakness, even though it moves all things, will never cease to rest: ὥστε οἰκειοτότατον μόνῳ θεῷ τὸ ἀναπαύεσθαι.” So in De Sacrif. Abelis et Caini, 8, τὸν τοσοῦτον κόσμον ἄνευ πόνων πάλαι μὲν εἰργάζετο, νυνὶ δὲ καὶ εἰσαεὶ συνέχων οὐδέποτε λήγει [cp. Hebrews 1:3 φέρων τε τὰ πάντα], θεῷ γὰρ τὸ ἀκάματον ἁρμοδιώτατον. All such speculations are remote from our author. He simply assumes (a) that God’s promise of κατάπαυσις is spiritual; it was not fulfilled, it was never meant to be fulfilled, in the peaceful settlement of the Hebrew clans in Canaan; (b) as a corollary of this, he assumes that it is eschatological.

In v. 9 ἄρα, as in 12:8, Luke 11:48, Acts 11:18, Romans 10:17, is thrown to the beginning by an unclassical turn (“müsste dem gebildeten Hellenen hochgradig anstössig erscheinen,” Radermacher, 20). Σαββατισμός, apparently1 a word coined by the writer, is a Semitic-Greek compound. The use of σαββατισμός for κατάπαυσις is then (v. 10) justified in language to which the closest parallel is Revelation 14:13. “Rest” throughout all this passage—and the writer never refers to it again—is the blissful existence of God’s faithful in the next world. As a contemporary apocalyptist put it, in 4 Es 8:52: “for you paradise is opened, the tree of life planted, the future age prepared, abundance made ready, a City built, a Rest appointed” (κατέσταθη?). In ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, as in διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος (13:12), ἴδιος is slightly emphatic owing to the context; it is not quite equivalent to the possessive pronoun.

When Maximus of Tyre speaks of life as a long, arduous path to the goal of bliss and perfection, he describes in semi-mystical language how tired souls, longing for the land to which this straight and narrow and little-frequented way leads, at length reach it and “rest from their labour” (Dissert. xxiii.).

The lesson thus drawn from the reading of the OT passages is pressed home (vv. 11-13) with a skilful blend of encouragement and warning.

11Let us be eager then to “enter that Rest,” in case anyone falls into the same sort of disobedience. 12For the Logos of God is a living thing, active and more cutting than any sword with double edge, penetrating to the very division of soul and spirit, joints and marrow—scrutinizing the very thoughts and conceptions of the heart. 13And no created thing is hidden from him; all things lie open and exposed before the eyes of him with whom we have to reckon (ὁ λόγος).

In v. 11 the position of τις, as, e.g., in Luke 18:18, is due to “the tendency which is to be noted early in Greek as well as in cognate languages, to bring unemphasized (enclitic) pronouns as near to the beginning of the sentence as possible” (Blass, § 473. 1). For πίπτειν ἐν, cp. Epict. 3:22, 48, πότε ὑμῶν εἶδέν μέ τις … ἐν ἐκκλίσει περιπίπτοντα. This Hellenistic equivalent for πίπτειν εἰς goes back to earlier usage, e.g. Eurip. Herc. 1091, 1092, ἐν κλύδωνι καὶ φρενῶν ταράγματι πέπτωκα δεινῷ. In Hellenistic Greek ὑπόδειγμα came to have the sense of παράδειγμα, and is used here loosely for “kind” or “sort”; take care of falling into disobedience like that of which these πατέρες ὑμῶν yield such a tragic example. The writer, with his fondness for periphrases of this kind, writes ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὑποδείγματι τῆς ἀπειθείας, where ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀπειθείᾳ would have served. In passing away from the text about Rest, he drops this last warning reference to the classical example of ἀπείθεια in the far past of the People.

The connexion of thought in vv. 11f. is suggested by what has been already hinted in v. 1, where the writer pled for anxiety, μή ποτε δοκῇ τις ἐξ ὑμῶν ὑστερηκέναι. He repeats ἵνα μὴ … τις … πέσῃ, and enlarges upon what lies behind the term δοκῇ. Then, after the passage on the relentless scrutiny of the divine Logos, he effects a transition to the direct thought of God (v. 13), with which the paragraph closes. Σπουδάσωμεν—we have to put heart and soul into our religion, for we are in touch with a God whom nothing escapes; ζῶν γάρ κτλ. (v. 12). The term ζῶν echoes θεὸς ζῶν in 3:12 (men do not disobey God with impunity), just as καρδίας echoes καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας. God is swift to mark any departure from his will in human thought—the thought that issues in action.

The personifying of the divine λόγος, in a passage which described God in action, had already been attempted. In Wis 18:15, for example, the plagues of Egypt are described as the effect of God’s λόγος coming into play: ὁ παντοδύναμός σου λόγος ἀπʼ οὐρανῶν … ξίφος ὀξὺ τὴν ἀνυπόκριτον ἐπιταγήν σου φέρων. In Wis 1:6, again, the φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα σοφία, which cannot tolerate blasphemy, reacts against it: ὅτι τῶν νεφρῶν αὐτοῦ (the blasphemer) μάρτυς ὁ θεός, καὶ τῆς καρδίας αὐτοῦ ἐπίσκοπος ἀληθής, so that no muttering of rebellion is unmarked. Here the writer poetically personifies the revelation of God for a moment. Ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ is God speaking, and speaking in words which are charged with doom and promise (3:7f.). The revelation, however, is broader than the scripture; it includes the revelation of God’s purpose in Jesus (1:1f.). The free application of ὁ λόγος (τοῦ θεοῦ) in primitive Christianity is seen in 1 P 1:23f., Jam 1:18f., quite apart from the specific application of the term to the person of Christ (John 1:1-18). Here it denotes the Christian gospel declared authoritatively by men like the writer, an inspired message which carries on the OT revelation of God’s promises and threats, and which is vitally effective. No dead letter, this λόγος! The rhetorical outburst in vv. 12f. is a preacher’s equivalent for the common idea that the sense of God’s all-seeing scrutiny should deter men from evil-doing, as, e.g., in Plautus (Captivi, 2. 63, “est profecto deu’, qui quae nos gerimus auditque et uidet”). This had been deepened by ethical writers like Seneca (Ep. lxxxiii. I, “nihil deo clusum est, interest animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis intervenit”), Epictetus (ii. 14, 11, οὐκ ἔστι λαθεῖν αὐτὸν οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντα ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ διανοούμενον ἢ ἐνθυμούμενον), and the author of the Epistle of Aristeas (132-133: Moses teaches ὅτι μόνος ὁ θεός ἐστι … καὶ οὐθὲν αὐτὸν λανθάνει τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς γινομένων ὑπʼ ἀνθρώπων κρυφίως … κἂν ἐννοηθῇ τις κακίαν ἐπιτελεῖν, οὐκ ἂν λάθοι, μὴ ὅτι καὶ πράξας, and 210: the characteristic note of piety is τὸ διαλαμβάνειν ὅτι πάντα διαπαντὸς ὁ θεὸς ἐνεργεῖ καὶ γινώσκει, καὶ οὐθὲν ἂν λάθοι ἄδικον ποιήσας ἢ κακὸν ἐργασάμενος ἄνθρωπος), as well as by apocalyptists like the author of Baruch (83:3: He will assuredly examine the secret thoughts and that which is laid up in the secret chambers of all the members of man). But our author has one particular affinity. Take Philo’s interpretation of διεῖλεν αὐτὰ μέσα in Genesis 15:10. Scripture means, he explains (quis rer. div. haeres, 26) that it was God who divided them, τῷ τομιεῖ τῶ συμπάντων ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ, ὃς εἰς τὴν ὀξυτάτην ἀκονηθεὶς ἀκμὴν διαιρῶν οὐδέποτε λήγει. τὰ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἐπειδὰν μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ λεγομένων ἀμερῶν διεξέλθῃ, πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτων τὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ εἰς ἀμυθήτους καὶ ἀπεριγράφους μοίρας ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν οὗτος ὁ τομεύς. He returns (in 48) to this analytic function of the Logos in God and man, and in De mutatione nominum (18) speaks of ἠκονημένον καὶ ὀξὺν λόγον, μαστεύειν καὶ ἀναζητεῖν ἕκαστα ἱκανόν. Still, the Logos is τομεύς as the principle of differentiation in the universe, rather than as an ethical force; and when Philo connects the latter with ὁ λόγος, as he does in quod deter. pot. 29, Cherub. 9, etc., ὁ λόγος is the human faculty of reason. Obviously, our author is using Philonic language rather than Philonic ideas.

Ἐνεργής (for which B, by another blunder, has ἐναργής = evidens) is not a LXX term, but denotes in Greek vital activity (cp. Schol. on Soph. Oed. Tyr. 45, ζώσας ἀντὶ ἐνεργεστέρας). Neither is τομώτερος a LXX term; the comparison of ὁ λόγος to a sword arose through the resemblance between the tongue and a “dagger,” though μάχαιρα had by this time come to mean a sword of any size, whether long (ῥομφαία) or short.1 The comparative is followed (cp. Luke 16:8) by ὑπέρ, as elsewhere by παρά, and the “cutting” power of ὁ λόγος extends or penetrates to the innermost recesses of human nature—ἄχρι μερισμοῦ ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος,2 ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν (the conj. μελῶν = limbs is neat but superfluous, for μυελῶν was in the text known to Clem. Alex. quis dives, 41). D K here (as in 11:32) insert τε before the first καί, but there is no idea of distinguishing the psychical and the physical spheres; ἅρμων … μυελῶν is merely a metaphorical equivalent for ψυχῆς καὶ πνεύματος. Μερισμός (only in LXX in Jb 11:23, Job 11:2 Ezra 6:18) means here “division,” not “distribution” (2:4); the subtlest relations of human personality, the very border-line between the ψυχή and the πνεῦμα, all this is open to ὁ λόγος. The metaphorical use of μυελῶν in this sense is as old as Euripides, who speaks of μὴ πρὸς ἄκρον μυελὸν ψυχῆς (Hippolytus, 255).

According to Philo (De Cherubim, 8, 9), the flaming sword of Genesis 3:24 is a symbol either of the sun, as the swiftest of existences (circling the whole world in a single day), or of reason, ὀξυκινητότατον γὰρ καὶ θέρμον λόγος καὶ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦ αἰτίου. Learn from the fiery sword, o my soul, he adds, to note the presence and power of this divine Reason, ὅς οὐδέποτε λήγει κινούμενος σπουδῇ πάσῃ πρὸς αἵρεσιν μὲν τῶν καλῶν, φυγὴν δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων. But there is a still better parallel to the thought in Lucian’s account of the impression made by the address (ὁ λόγος) of a philosopher: οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἐπιπολῆς οὐδʼ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος καθίκετο, βαθεῖα δὲ καὶ καίριος ἡ πληγὴ ἐγένετο, καὶ μάλα εὐστόχως ἐνεχθεὶς ὁ λόγος αὐτήν, εἰ οἶόν τε εἰπεῖν, διέκοψε τὴν ψυχήν (Nigr. 35). Only, Lucian proceeds to compare the soul of a cultured person to a target at which the words of the wise are aimed. Similarly, in pseudo-Phocylides, 124: ὅπλον τοι λόγος ἀνδρὶ τομώτερον ἐστι σιδήρου, and Od. Sol. 12:5: for the swiftness of the Word is inexpressible, and like its expression is its swiftness and force, and its course knows no limit.

The μερισμοῦ … μυελῶν passage is “a mere rhetorical accumulation of terms to describe the whole mental nature of man” (A. B. Davidson); the climax is καρδία, for what underlies human failure is καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπίστιας (3:12), and the writer’s warning all along has been against hardening the heart, i.e. obdurate disobedience. Hence the point of καὶ κριτικός κτλ. Κριτικός is another of his terms which are classical, not religious; it is used by Aristotle (Eth. Nik. vi. 10) of ἡ σύνεσις, the intelligence of man being κριτική in the sense that it discerns. If there is any distinction between ἐνθυμήσεων (ἐνθυμήσεως C* D* W vt Lucifer) and ἐννοιῶν, it is between impulses and reflections, but contemporary usage hardly distinguished them; indeed ἔννοια could mean “purpose” as well as “conception.” The two words are another alliterative phrase for “thought and conception,” ἔννοια, unlike ἐνθύμησις, being a LXX term.

In v. 13 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν κτίσις ἀφανής κτλ., κτίσις means anything created (as in Romans 8:39), and αὐτοῦ is “God’s.” The negative side is followed by the positive, πάντα δὲ γυμνὰ καὶ τετραχηλισμένα. The nearest verbal parallel is in En 9:5 πάντα ἐνώπιόν σου φανερὰ καὶ ἀκάλυπτα, where the context points as here to secret sins. The general idea was familiar; e.g. (above, p. 55) “nihil deo clusum est, interest animis nostris et cogitationibus mediis intervenit.” Μόνῳ γὰρ ἔξεστι θεῷ, ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν (Philo, de Abrahamo, 21). But what the writer had in mind was a passage like that in de Cherub. 5, where Philo explains Deuteronomy 29:29 (τὰ κρυπτὰ κυρίῳ τῷ θεῷ, τὰ δὲ φανερὰ γενέσει γνώριμα) by arguing, γενητὸς δὲ οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς γνώμης ἀφανοῦς κατιδεῖν ἐνθύμημα, μόνος δὲ ὁ θεός. Hence, he adds, the injunction (Numbers 5:18) τὴν ψυχὴν “ἐναντίον τοῦθεοῦ στῆσαι” with head uncovered; which means, the soul τὸ κεφάλαιον δόγμα γυμνωθεῖσαν καὶ τὴν γνώμην ᾗ κέχρηται ἀπαμφιασθεῖσαν, ἵνʼ ὄψεσι ταῖς ἀκριβεστάταις ἐπικριθεῖσα τοῦ ἀδεκάστου θεοῦ κτλ., the closing description of God being τῷ μόνῳ γυμνὴν ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν δυναμένῳ. For γυμνά see also M. Aurel. 12:2 ὁ θεὸς πάντα τὰ ἡγεμονικὰ γυμνὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἀγγείων … ὁρᾷ. Τετραχηλισμένα must mean something similar, “exposed” or “bared” (“aperta,” vg; πεφανερωμένα, Hesych.).

Though τραχηλιζω does not occur in the LXX, the writer was familiar with it in Philo, where it suggests a wrestler “downing” his opponent by seizing his throat. How this metaphorical use of throttling or tormenting could yield the metaphorical passive sense of “exposed,” is not easy to see. The Philonic sense of “depressed” or “bent down” would yield here the meaning “abashed,” i.e. hanging down the head in shame (“conscientia male factorum in ruborem aguntur caputque mittunt,” Wettstein). But this is hardly on a level with γυμνά. The most probable clue is to be found in the practice of exposing an offender’s face by pushing his head back, as if the word were an equivalent for the Latin “resupinata” in the sense of “manifesta.” The bending back of the neck produced this exposure. Thus when Vitellius was dragged along the Via Sacra to be murdered, it was “reducto coma capite, ceu noxii solent, atque etiam mento mucrone gladii subrecto, ut visendam praeberet faciem” (Suet. Vit. Vitell. 17).

In the last five words, πρὸς ὃν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, which are impressive by their bare simplicity, there is a slight play on the term λόγος here and in v. 12, although in view of the flexible use of the term, e.g. in 5:11 and 13:17, it might be even doubtful if the writer intended more than a verbal assonance. The general sense of the phrase is best conveyed by “with whom we have to reckon.” (a) This rendering, “to whom we have to account (or, to render our account),” was adopted without question by the Greek fathers from Chrysostom (αὐτῷ μέλλομεν δοῦναι εὐθύνας τῶν πεπραγμένων) onwards, and the papyri support the origin of the phrase as a commercial metaphor; e.g. OP. 1188:5 (a.d. 13) ὡς πρὸς σὲ τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἀγνοη[θέντων] ζη[τήματος] ἐσο[μένου] (sc. λόγου), and Hibeh Papyri, 53:4 (24:6 b.c.) πειρῶ οὖν ἀσφολῶς ὡς πρὸς σὲ τοῦ λόγου ἐσομένου. (b) The alternative rendering, “with whom we have to do,” has equal support in Gk. usage; e.g. in the LXX phrase λόγος μοι πρός σε (1 K 2:14, 2 K 9:5) and in Jdg 17:7 (μακράν εἰσιν Σιδωνίων, καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἔχουσιν πρὸς ἄνθρωπον). The former idea is predominant, however, as the context suggests (cp. Ignat. ad Magn 3, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον οὐ πρὸς σάρκα ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεὸν τὸν τὰ κρύφια εἰδότα), and includes the latter. It is plainly the view of the early anti-Marcionite treatise, which has been preserved among the works of Ephraem Syrus (cp. Preuschen, Zeitschrift für die neutest. Wissenschaft, 1911, pp. 243-269), where the passage is quoted from a text like this: ὡς καὶ ὁ Παῦλος λέγει, ζῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πασὰν μάχαιραν δίστομον, διϊκνούμενον μέχρι μερισμοῦ πνεύματος καὶ σαρκός, μέχρι ἁρμῶν τε καὶ μυελῶν, καὶ κριτικός ἐστιν ἐνθυμήσεων καὶ ἐννοιῶν καρδίας· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν κτίσις ἀφανὴς ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐμφανῇ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, ὅτι γυμνοὶ καὶ τετραχηλισμένοι ἐσμὲν ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν λόγον αὐτῷ ἀποδιδόναι. The rendering, “who is our subject, of whom we are speaking” (πρός = with reference to, and ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος as in 5:11), is impossibly flat.

At this point the writer effects a transition to the main theme, which is to occupy him till 10:18, i.e. Christ as ἀρχιερεύς. He begins, however, by a practical appeal (vv. 14-16) which catches up the ideas of 2:17, 18, 3:1.

14As we have a great highpriest, then, who has passed through the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold fast to our confession; 5for ours is no high priest who is incapable (μὴ δυν. as in 9:9) of sympathizing with our weaknesses, but one who has been tempted in every respect like ourselves (sc. πρὸς ἡμᾶς), yet without sinning. 16So let us approach the throne of grace with confidence (μετὰ παρρησίας, 3:6), that we may receive mercy and find grace to help us in the hour of need.

Μέγας is a favourite adjective for ἀρχιερεύς in Philo,1 but when the writer adds, ἔχοντες οὖν ἀρχιερέα μέγαν διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς, he is developing a thought of his own. The greatness of Jesus as ἀρχιερεύς consists in his access to God not through any material veil, but through the upper heavens; he has penetrated to the very throne of God, in virtue of his perfect self-sacrifice. This idea is not elaborated till later (cp. 6:19f, 9:24f.), in the sacerdotal sense. But it has been already mentioned in 2:9, 10, where Jesus the Son of God saves men by his entrance into the full divine glory. Κρατῶμεν here as in 6:18 with the genitive (ὁμολογιάς, see 3:1); in Paul it takes the accusative. The writer now (v. 15) reiterates the truth of 2:11f.; the exalted Jesus is well able to sympathize with weak men on earth, since he has shared their experience of temptation. It is put negatively, then positively. Συμπαθῆσαι is used of Jesus1 as in Acta Pauli et Theclae, 17 (ὃς μόνος συνεπάθησεν πλανωμένῳ κόσμῳ); see below, on 10:34. Origen (in Matt. xiii. 2) quotes a saying of Jesus: διὰ τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας ἠσθένουν καὶ διὰ τοὺς πεινῶντας ἐπείνων καὶ διὰ τοὺς διψῶντας ἐδίψων, the first part of which may go back to Matthew 8:17 (αὐτὸς τὰς ἀσθενείας ἔλαβεν); cp. also Matthew 25:35f.. Philo uses the term even of the Mosaic law (de spec. eg. ii. 13, τῷ δὲ ἀπόρως ἔχοντι συνεπάθησε), but here it is more than “to be considerate.” The aid afforded by Jesus as ἀρχιερεύς is far more than official; it is inspired by fellow-feeling ταῖς ἀσθενείαις ἡμῶν. “Verius sentiunt qui simul cum externis aerumnis comprehendunt animi affectus, quales sunt metus, tristitia, horror mortis, et similes” (Calvin). These ἀσθένειαι are the sources of temptation. Ἠ σὰρξ ἀσθενής, as Jesus had said to his disciples, warning them against temptation. Jesus was tempted κατὰ πάντα (2:17, 18) καθʼ ὁμοιότητα (a psychological Stoic term; the phrase occurs in OP ix. 1202:24 and BGU 1028:15, in second-century inscriptions) χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας, without yielding to sin. Which is a real ground for encouragement, for the best help is that afforded by those who have stood where we slip and faced the onset of temptation without yielding to it. The special reference is to temptations leading to apostasy or disobedience to the will of God. It is true that χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας does exclude some temptations. Strictly speaking, κατὰ πάντα is modified by this restriction, since a number of our worst temptations arise out of sin previously committed. But this is not in the writer’s mind at all. He is too eager, to enter into any psychological analysis.

Philo deduces from Leviticus 4:3 (μόνον οὐκ ἄντικρυς ἀναδιδάσκων, ὅτι ὁ πρὸς ὰλήθειαν ἀρχιερεὺς καὶ μὴ ψευδώνυμος ἀμέτοχος ἁμαρτημάτων ἐστίν) that the ideal highpriest is practically sinless (de Victimis, 10); but this is a thought with which he wistfully toys, and the idea of the Logos as unstained by contact with the material universe is very different from this conception of Jesus as actually tempted and scatheless. Nor would the transference of the idea of messiah as sinless account for our writer’s view. To him and his readers Jesus is sinless, not in virtue of a divine prerogative, but as the result of a real human experience which proved successful in the field of temptation.

Hence (v. 16) προσερχώμεθα οὖν μετὰ παρρησίας. Philo (quis rer. div. haeres, 2) makes παρρησία the reward of a good conscience, which enables a loyal servant of God to approach him frankly. But here (cp. ERE ii. 786) παρρησία is not freedom of utterance so much as resolute confidence (cp. on 3:6). Our writer certainly includes prayer in this conception of approaching God, but it is prayer as the outcome of faith and hope. Seneca bids Lucilius pray boldly to God, if his prayers are for soundness of soul and body, not for any selfish and material end: “audacter deum roga; nihil illum de alieno rogaturus es” (Ep. x. 4). But even this is not the meaning of παρρησία here. The Roman argues that a man can only pray aloud and confidently if his desires are such as he is not ashamed to have others hear, whereas the majority of people “whisper basest of prayers to God.” Our author does not mean “palam” by παρρησία.

Our approach (προσερχώμεθα: the verb in the sense of applying to a court or authority, e.g. in OP 1119:8 προσήλθομεν τῇ κρατίστῃ βουλῇ, BGU 1022) is τῷ θρονῷ τῆς χάριτος, for grace is now enthroned (see 2:9f.). For the phrase see Isaiah 16:5 διορθωθήσεται μετʼ ἐλέους θρόνος. Our author (cp. Introd. p. xlvii), like those who shared the faith of apocalyptic as well as of rabbinic piety, regarded heaven as God’s royal presence and also as the σκηνή where he was worshipped, an idea which dated from Isaiah 6:1f. and Psa_29 (cp. Mechilta on Exodus 15:17), though he only alludes incidentally (12:22) to the worship of God by the host of angels in the upper sanctuary. He is far from the pathetic cry of Azariah (Dn 3:38): ὠκ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ … οὔδε τόπος τοῦ καρπῶσαι ἐνώπιόν σου καὶ εὑρεῖν ἔλεος. He rather shares Philo’s feeling (de Exsecrat. 9) that οἱ ἀνασῳζομένοι can rely upon the compassionate character of God (ἑνὶ μὲν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ χρηστότητι τοῦ παρακαλουμένου συγγνώμην πρὸ τιμωρίας ἀεὶ τιθέντος), though he regards this mercy as conditioned by the sacrifice of Jesus. The twofold object of the approach is (a) λαμβάνειν ἔλεος, which is used for the passive of ἐλεῶ (which is rare), and (b) χάριν εὑρίσκειν κτλ., an echo of the LXX phrase (e.g. Genesis 6:8) εὑρίσκειν χάριν ἐναντίον κυρίου (τοῦ θεοῦ). In the writer’s text (A) of the LXX, Proverbs 8:17 ran οἱ δὲ ἐμὲ ζητοῦντες εὑρήσουσι χάριν.1 Εἰς εὔκαιρον βοήθειαν recalls τοῖς πειραζομένοις βοηθῆσαι in 2:18; it signifies “for assistance in the hour of need.” Εὔκαιρος means literally “seasonable,” as in Psalm 104:27 (δοῦναι τὴν τροφὴν αὐτοῖς εὔκαιρον), “fitting” or “opportune” (Ep. Aristeas, 203, 236). The “sympathy” of Jesus is shown by practical aid to the tempted, which is suitable to their situation, suitable above all because it is timely (εὔκαιρον being almost equivalent to ἐν καιρῷ χρείας, Sir 8:9). Philo (de sacrificantibus, 10) shows how God, for all his greatness, cherishes compassion (ἔλεον καὶ οἶκτον λαμβάνει τῶν ἐν ἐνδείαις ἀπορωτάτων) for needy folk, especially for poor proselytes, who, in their devotion to him, are rewarded by his help (καρπὸν εὑράμενοι τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν καταφυγῆς τὴν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ βοήθειαν). But the best illustration of the phrase is in Aristides, Εἰς τὸν Σάραπιν 50: σὲ γὰρ δὴ πᾶς τις ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ βοηθὸν καλεῖ, Σάραπι.

How widely even good cursives may be found supporting a wrong reading is shown by the evidence for προσερχόμεθα: 6. 38. 88. 104. 177. 206*. 241. 255. 263. 337. 378. 383. 440. 462. 467. 487. 489. 623. 635. 639. 642. 915. 919. 920. 927. 1149. 1245. 1288. 1518. 1836. 1852. 1872. 1891. 2004. For ἔλεος (the Hellenistic neuter, cp. Cronert’s Memoria Graeca Herculanensis, 176:1), the Attic ἔλεον (ἔλεος, masc.) is substituted by L and a few minuscules (Chrys. Theodoret). B om. εὕρωμεν.

1 Ἀπείθειαν, altered into ἀπιστίαν by א*vg sah boh arm Cyr.

LXX The Old Testament in Greek according to the Septuagint Version (ed. H. B. Swete).

D [06: α 1026] cont. 1:1-13:20. Codex Claromontanus is a Graeco-Latin MS, whose Greek text is poorly* reproduced in the later (saec. ix.-x.) E = codex Sangermanensis. The Greek text of the latter (1:1-12:8) is therefore of no independent value (cp. Hort in WH, §§ 335-337); for its Latin text, as well as for that of F=codex Augiensis (saec. ix.), whose Greek text of Πρὸς Ἐβραίους has not been preserved, see below, p. lxix.

255 [α 174]

Philo Philonis Alexandriai Opera Quae Supersunt (recognoverunt L. Cohn et P. Wendland).

Josephus Flavii Josephi Opera Omnia post Immanuelem Bekkerum, recognovit S. A. Naber.

1 An almost contemporary instance (εὐαγγελίζοντι τὰ τῆς νείκης αὐτοῦ καὶ προκοπῆς) of the active verb is cited by Mitteis-Wilcken, i. 2, 29.

vg vg Vulgate, saec. iv.

אԠ[01: δ 2).

vt vt Old Latin, saec. ii. (?)-iv.

p [α 1034] cont. 2:14-5:6 10:8-11:13 11:28-12:17: Oxyrhynchus Papyri, iv. (1904) 36-48. The tendency, in 2:14-5:5, to agree with B “in the omission of unessential words and phrases … gives the papyrus peculiar value in the later chapters, where B is deficient”; thus p 13 partially makes up for the loss of B after 9:14. Otherwise the text of the papyrus is closest to that of D.

A [02: δ 4].

B [03: δ 1] cont. 1:1-9:18: for remainder cp. cursive 293.

C [04: δ 3] cont. 2:4-7:26 9:15-10:24 12:16-13:25.

K [018:1:1].

L [020: α 5] cont. 1:1-13:10.

M [0121: α 1031] cont. 1:1-4:3 12:20-13:25.

P [025: α 3] cont. 1:1-12:8 12:11-13:25.

boh The Coptic Version of the NT in the Northern Dialect (Oxford, 1905), vol. iii. pp. 472-555.

104 [α 103]

1611 [α 208]

2005 [α 1436] cont. 1:1-7:2

d (Latin version of D)

1908 [O π 103]

Ψ̠[044: δ 6] cont. 1:1-8:11 9:19-13:25.

6 [δ 356] cont. 1:1-9:3 10:22-13:25

33 [δ 48] Hort’s 17

1 A similar error of A C in 6:2.

69 [δ 505]

sah The Coptic Version of the NT in the Southern Dialect (Oxford, 1920), vol. v. pp. 1-131.

2 [α 253]

330 [δ 259]

440 [δ 260]

623 [α 173]

642 [α 552] cont. 1:1-7:18 9:13-13:25

1288 [α 162]

1319 [δ 180]

1912 [α 1066]

OP The Oxyrhynchus Papyri (ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. Hunt).

2004 [α 56]

256 [α 216]

263 [δ 372]

436 [α 172]

442 [O 18]

999 [δ 353]

1739 [α 78]

1837 [α 192]

Radermacher Neutestamentliche Grammatik (1911), in Lietzmann’s Handbuch zum Neuen Testament (vol. i.).

1 The only classical instance is uncertain; Bernadakis suspects it in the text of Plutarch, de superstit. 166 A.

Blass F. Blass, Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch: vierte, völlig neugearbeitete Auflage, besorgt von Albert Debrunner (1913); also, Brief an die Hebräer, Text mit Angabe der Rhythmen (1903).

1 The description was familiar to readers of the LXX, e.g. Proverbs 5:4 ἠκονημένον μᾶλλον μαχαίρας διστόμου.

2 The subtlety of thought led afterwards to the change of πνεύματος into σώματος (2, 38, 257, 547, 1245).

W [I] cont. 1:1-3, 9-12. 2:4-7, 12-14. 3:4-6, 14-16 4:3-6, 12-14 5:5-7 6:1-3, 10-13, 20 7:1-2, 7-11, 18-20, 27-28 8:1, 7-9 9:1-4, 9-11, 16-19, 25-27 10:5-8, 16-18, 26-29, 35-38 11:6-7, 12-15, 22-24, 31-33, 38-40 12:1, 7-9, 16-18, 25-27 13:7-9, 16-18, 23-25: NT MSS in Freer Collection, The Washington MS of the Epp. of Paul (1918), pp. 294-306. Supports Alexandrian text, and is “quite free from Western readings.”

1 ὁ μὲν δὴ μέγας ἀρχιερεύς (de Somn. i. 38), even of the Logos.

1 Of God in 4 Mac 5:25 κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν συμπαθεῖ νομοθετῶν ὁ τοῦ κτίστης, but in the weaker sense of consideration. It is curious that 4 Mac., like Hebrews, uses the word twice, once of God and once of men (cp. 4 Mac 13:23 οὕτως δὴ τοίνυν καθεστηκυίας τῆς φιλαδελφίας συμπαθούσης).

BGU Aegyptische Urkunden (Griechisch Urkunden), ed. Wilcken (1895).

ERE Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (ed. J. Hastings).

1 Aristotle argues that χάρις or benevolence must be spontaneous and disinterested; also, that its value is enhanced by necessitous circumstances (ἕστω δὴ χάρις, καθʼ ἢν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ὑπουργεῖν δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντί τινος, μηδʼ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλʼ ἵνʼ ἐκείνῳ τι· μεγάλη δʼ ἂν ᾖ σφόδρα δεομένῳ, ἢ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἢ ἐν καιροῖς τοιουτοῖς, ἢ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μάλιστα, Rhet. ii. 7. 2).

38 [δ 355]

88 [α 200]

177 [α 106]

206 [α 365]

241 [δ 507]

337 [α 205]

378 [α 258]

383 [α 353] cont. 1:1-13:7

462 [α 502]

487 [α 171]

489 [δ 459] Hort’s 102

639 [α 169]

915 [α 382]

919 [α 113]

920 [α 55]

927 [δ 251]

1149 [δ 370]

1245 [α 158]

1518 [α 116]

1836 [α 65]

1852 [α 114] cont. 1:1-11:10

1872 [α 209]

1891 [α 62]