Romans 3:7
For if the truth of God has more abounded through my lie to his glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner?
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(7) The truth of God.—In the first instance His veracity as involved in His threats and promises, and then those other attributes, especially justice, that are intimately connected with this. “Truth” is leaning towards its moral sense. (See Note on Romans 2:8.)

My lie.—The Apostle puts his supposed case in the first person. “Lie,” suggested as an antithesis to the word “truth,” just used, has also a moral signification. It is the moral deflection that follows upon unbelief.

Romans 3:7-8. For — Or but (the objector may reply) if the truth of God hath more abounded — Has been more abundantly shown; through my lie — If my lie, that is, practice contrary to truth, conduces to the glory of God, by making his truth shine with superior advantage; why am I yet judged as a sinner — And arraigned for that which is attended with such happy consequences? Can my conduct be said to be sinful at all? Ought I not to do what would otherwise be evil, that so much good may come? To this the apostle does not deign to give a direct answer, adding, whose damnation, or condemnation, is just. The condemnation of all, who either speak or act in this manner. Here the apostle teaches expressly the unlawfulness of doing evil, any evil, on the pretence of promoting what is good. Such a pretence, if allowed, would justify the greatest crimes. This, however, the apostle here signifies they were slanderously reported as teaching; probably on a misinterpretation of their doctrine, that the greatness of the sins of which the Gentiles were guilty, rendered God’s goodness in sending Christ to die for them the more illustrious.3:1-8 The law could not save in or from sins, yet it gave the Jews advantages for obtaining salvation. Their stated ordinances, education in the knowledge of the true God and his service, and many favours shown to the children of Abraham, all were means of grace, and doubtless were made useful to the conversion of many. But especially the Scriptures were committed to them. Enjoyment of God's word and ordinances, is the chief happiness of a people. But God's promises are made only to believers; therefore the unbelief of some, or of many professors, cannot make this faithfulness of no effect. He will fulfil his promises to his people, and bring his threatened vengeance upon unbelievers. God's judging the world, should for ever silence all doubtings and reflections upon his justice. The wickedness and obstinate unbelief of the Jews, proved man's need of the righteousness of God by faith, and also his justice in punishing for sin. Let us do evil, that good may come, is oftener in the heart than in the mouth of sinners; for few thus justify themselves in their wicked ways. The believer knows that duty belongs to him, and events to God; and that he must not commit any sin, or speak one falsehood, upon the hope, or even assurance, that God may thereby glorify himself. If any speak and act thus, their condemnation is just.For if ... - This is an objection similar to the former. It is indeed but another form of the same.

The truth of God - His truth or faithfulness in adhering to his threatenings. God threatened to punish the guilty. By their guilt he will take occasion to show his own truth; or their crime will furnish occasion for such an exhibition.

Hath more abounded - Has been more striking, or more manifest. His "truth" will be shown by the fulfillment of all his promises to his people, and of all his predictions. But it will also be shown by fulfilling his threatenings on the guilty. It will, therefore, more abound by their condemnation; that is, their condemnation will furnish new and striking instances or his truth. Every lost sinner will be, therefore, an eternal monument of the truth of God.

Through my lie - By means of my lie, or as one of the results of my falsehood. The word "lie" here means falsehood, deceitfulness, "unfaithfulness." If by the unfaithfulness of the Jewish people to the covenant, occasion should be given to God to glorify himself, how could they be condemned for it?

Unto his glory - To his praise, or so as to show his character in such a way as to excite the praise and admiration of his intelligent creation.

Why yet am I ... - How can that act be regarded as evil, which tends to promote the glory of God? The fault in the reasoning of the objector is this, that he takes for granted that the direct tendency of his conduct is to promote God's glory, whereas it is just the reverse; and it is by God's reversing that tendency, or overruling it, that he obtains his glory. The tendency of murder is not to honor the Law, or to promote the security of society, but just the reverse. Still, his execution shall avert the direct tendency of his crime, and do honor to the law and the judge, and promote the peace and security of the community by restraining others.

7, 8. For if the truth of God, &c.—A further illustration of the same sentiment: that is, "Such reasoning amounts to this—which indeed we who preach salvation by free grace are slanderously accused of teaching—that the more evil we do, the more glory will redound to God; a damnable principle." (Thus the apostle, instead of refuting this principle, thinks it enough to hold it up to execration, as one that shocks the moral sense).

On this brief section, Note (1) Mark the place here assigned to the Scriptures. In answer to the question, "What advantage hath the Jew?" or, "What profit is there of circumcision?" (Ro 3:1) those holding Romish views would undoubtedly have laid the stress upon the priesthood, as the glory of the Jewish economy. But in the apostle's esteem, "the oracles of God" were the jewel of the ancient Church (Ro 3:1, 2). (2) God's eternal purposes and man's free agency, as also the doctrine of salvation by grace and the unchanging obligations of God's law, have ever been subjected to the charge of inconsistency by those who will bow to no truth which their own reason cannot fathom. But amidst all the clouds and darkness which in this present state envelop the divine administration and many of the truths of the Bible, such broad and deep principles as are here laid down, and which shine in their own luster, will be found the sheet-anchor of our faith. "Let God be true, and every man a liar" (Ro 3:4); and as many advocates of salvation by grace as say, "Let us do evil that good may come," "their damnation is just" (Ro 3:8).

By truth he means the faithfulness and veracity of God; as by lie, the perfidiousness and inconstancy of man; ut supra et alibi.

Why yet am I also judged as a sinner? q.d. If more glory accrues to the name of God by my wickedness, what reason is there that I should be punished, and proceeded against as an offender, who have occasioned this further glory to God? The apostle doth plainly personate in this place a wicked objector, or he speaks in the name and person of such a one. This way of speaking and writing is very frequent among all authors; and it is found sometimes with the penmen of the Holy Scriptures: see Ecclesiastes 3:19-22 1 Corinthians 15:32. The apostle tells the Corinthians, 1 Corinthians 4:6, that in a figure he transferred some things to himself and to Apollos for their sakes, that they might not be puffed up; he, counted such schemes and figures as these to be most profitable and efficacious to the reader. For if the truth of God,.... The "truth of God" is the same with "the righteousness of God", Romans 3:5, and means his faithfulness; of which it is hypothetically said, it

hath more abounded; or has been more illustrated,

through my lie to his glory: nothing is more opposite to truth than a lie; a lie of itself can never be of any advantage to truth, or to the God of truth; nothing is more contrary to the nature of God, and more abominable to him; a lie is of the devil, and punishable with eternal death; wherefore it may seem strange, that the truth of God should abound through it to his glory: now let it be observed, that the apostle is not speaking of himself, nor of his lie of unbelief, in his state of unregeneracy; but in the person of a sinful man, "for every man is a liar", Romans 3:4, as he says, "I speak as a man", Romans 3:5; representing a wicked man, who from what was before said, might collect this as the sense of it, that the truth of God is illustrated by the lies of men: and so much may be owned as the apostle's sense, that the truth of God is commended, illustrated, and made to abound, when it is asserted, that he is true and faithful, and every man is a liar, fallacious, and deceitful; "let God be true, and every man a liar", Romans 3:4, moreover, the truth of God may be allowed to abound through the lies of men, in a comparative sense, the one being set against the other; and so as contraries do, illustrate each other: this may be assented to, as that sometimes a lie has been overruled by God, for the accomplishing of his purposes and promises, in which his truth and faithfulness have been displayed, as in the cases of Jacob and the Egyptian midwives; but then this does not arise from its nature and tendency, but from the overruling wisdom and providence of God, and therefore not to be excused hereby from sin; and consequently the inference from it is not just, that therefore "no man can, or ought to be, judged as a sinner"; since his sin turns to such account, as to make for the glory of God, which is intimated in the question:

why yet am I also judged as a sinner? if this be the case, I ought not to be reckoned a sinner, or to be treated as such here, or judged and condemned as one hereafter, which is a most wicked, as well as weak consequence; for though God is true and faithful to his promises, notwithstanding the sins of his people, which are as a foil, to set off the lustre of his truth the more, yet their sins are nevertheless sins, and are taken notice of by him as such, and they are corrected for them; and however God may overrule, in a providential way, the sins of others for his glory, this is no excuse for their sins, nor will it be an exemption of them from punishment. This is the sense of the passage; unless by "the truth of God" should be meant, the Gospel, the word of truth, which is of God; and which through the apostle's "lie", as the Jews might call his ministration of it, "abounded to" the "glory" of God; being spread far and near, and made useful for the conversion of sinners, for turning men from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God; and for the planting of churches in the Gentile world, as well as in Judea; which much conduced to the honour of God, and the interest of true religion: and then the meaning of the last clause is, "why yet am I also judged as a sinner?" why am I accounted and condemned as an heretic? as an apostate from the faith? as he was by the Jews, and who are used to call heretics sinners: so "the sinner" in Ecclesiastes 7:26 is thus interpreted (p), "these are the heretics": and elsewhere it (q) is observed, that concerning the heretics it is said, Proverbs 10:7, "the name of the wicked shall rot": and I very much suspect this to be the sense of the word in John 9:24, "we know that this man is a sinner"; an heretic, a man of bad principles; and in John 9:31; "now we know that God heareth not sinners"; men of corrupt minds; since this character stands opposed to a worshipper of the God of Israel.

(p) Midrash Kohelet, fol. 77. 1.((q) Juchasin, fol. 130. 2.

{3} For if the {i} truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner?

(3) A third objection, which adds somewhat to the former: if sins turn out to the glory of God, they are not only not to be punished, but we ought rather to give ourselves to them: and this blasphemy Paul, as he fights to curse and detest it, pronounces it to be a just punishment against such blasphemers.

(i) The truth and unchangingness.

Romans 3:7 f. The ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τ. κόσμ. receives its illustrative confirmation; for as to the case of God, who would thus be unrighteous and nevertheless is to judge the world, every ground for judging man as a sinner must be superseded by the circumstance already discussed, viz. that His truth has been glorified by man’s falsehood (Romans 3:4 f.); and (Romans 3:8) as to the case of man himself, there would result the principle directly worthy of condemnation, that he should do evil in order that good might come. Comp Th. Schott, and in substance also Hofmann and Morison. The argument accordingly rests on the basis, that in the case put (ἘΠΕΊ from Romans 3:6) the relation of God to the judgment of the world would yield two absurd consequences. (See this, as early as Chrysostom.) Another view is that of Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Wolf, and many others, including Rückert, Kollner, Tholuck, Philippi and Umbreit, that the objection of Romans 3:5 is here amplified. But it is quite as arbitrary and in fact impossible (hence Philippi resorts to the violent expedient of putting in a parenthesis not only ΚΑΤᾺ ἌΝΘΡ. ΛΈΓΩ, but also ΜῊ ΓΈΝΟΙΤΟ.… ΚΌΣΜΟΝ), with the reference of ΓΆΡ, to overleap entirely Romans 3:6, as it is strange to make the discourse so completely abrupt and to represent the Apostle as making no reply at all to the first part of the alleged amplification of the objection (to Romans 3:7), and as replying to the second part (Romans 3:8) only by an anathema, sit! (ὧν τ. κρ. ἔνδ. .). Against the view of Reiche, who, following Koppe, Rosenmüller, and Flatt, thinks that the Gentile is introduced as speaking in Romans 3:7 (compare Olshausen), we may decisively urge the close connection therewith of Romans 3:8, where Paul includes himself also, but does not “take speech in hand again” (Reiche). See besides on τὸν κόσμον, Romans 3:6.

ἈΛΉΘΕΙΑ and ΨΕΎΣΜΑΤΙ are terms chosen in reference to Romans 3:4, because the question proposed in Romans 3:5 was in fact suggested by that verse; but they represent, as Romans 3:5 proves, the ideas of ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΎΝΗ and ἈΔΙΚΊΑ; hence: the moral truth, i.e. the holy righteousness of God (see on John 3:21; Ephesians 5:9; Php 4:8), and the moral falsehood, i.e. the immorality (Revelation 22:15), wickedness of man.[756]

ἐπερίσσευσεν εἰς τ. δόξ. αὐτοῦ] has abounded richly to His glory, that is, has shown itself in superabundant measure, which redounds to His glory. The stress of this protasis lies on ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι.

The aorist denotes the result of the having abounded, which subsists at the day of judgment (realised as present by τί.… κρίνομαι) as up to that point accomplished fact.

ἔτι] namely, after that assumed result has occurred.

κἀγώ] emphasising the contradictory relation to the contents of the protasis, according to which this ἐγώ seems actually to have deserved something of God: even I (Baeumlein, Partik. p. 150) who have notwithstanding glorified God through my ψεύσμα. So in substance (“just I” according to Hermann, a[757] Viger. p. 837) also Tholuck and Morison; compare Philippi: “even I still.” There lies in the expression something of boldness and defiance; but it is not equivalent to καὶ αὐτός, or αὐτός ἐγώ, to the meaning of which Th. Schott and Hofmann ultimately bring it (“even personally still”). We may add that this first person, individualising just like the preceding one (ἐν τ. ἐμῷ ψ.), of course represents the sinner in general (with an intended application to the Jews, see on Romans 3:5 f), and not the Apostle himself, as Schrader and Fritzsche think. Against this latter theory it is decisive that κρίνομαι after Romans 3:6 must indicate, not the judgment of enemies, but necessarily the divine act of judging.

ὡς ἁμαρτ.] as a sinner, not “as a Gentile” (Reiche, Mehring), and others.

Romans 3:8. καὶ μή] Before μή we must again supply τί: and why should we not, etc. Respecting τί μή, quidni, see Hartung, Partikell. II. p. 162. Accordingly, as καί continues the question, only a comma is to be placed after κρίνομαι.

As regards the construction, Paul has dropped the plan of the sentence begun with καὶ μή (and why should we not do evil, etc.), being led away from it by the inserted remark, and has joined ὅτι ποιήσωμεν in direct address (let us do) to the λέγειν, so that ὅτι is recitative. But on account of this very blending there is no necessity either to make a parenthesis or to supply anything. For similar attractions (compare especially Xen. Anab. vi. 4, 18) in which the discourse is interrupted by an intervening clause, and then continued in a regimen dependent on the latter and no longer suitable to the beginning, see Hermann a[758] Viger. p. 745, 894; Bernhardy, p. 464; Dissen, a[759] Dem. de cor. p. 346, 418; Krüger, gramm. Unters. p. 457 ff. Many erroneous attempts have been made by commentators (see the various explanations in Morison) to bring out an unbroken construction, as e.g. the supplying of ἐροῦμεν or some such word after μή (Erasmus, Calvin, Wolf, Koppe, Benecke, and others, also van Hengel). Even the expedient of Matthias is untenable.[760] The same may be said of that of Hofmann, who supplies an ἐστίν after καὶ μή, and renders: “Why does it not happen to me according to that, as (καθώς) we are slandered,” etc. But if it is quite gratuitous to supply ἐστί, it is still more so to make this ἐστί equivalent to γίνεται μοι. Besides the negation, which, according to our construction, harmonises with the deliberative sense, would necessarily be not μή but οὐ, since it would negative the reality of the εἶναι understood (1 Corinthians 6:7; Luke 19:23; Luke 20:5 al[761]). The correct view is held also by Winer and Buttmann (p. 235, 211), Philippi and Morison.

καθὼς βλασφημ.] as we (Christians) are calumniated, namely, as if we did evil in order that, etc. Then the following καὶ καθὼς.… λέγειν contains the accusation, current possibly in Rome also, that the Christians were in the habit of repeating this maxim even as a doctrinal proposition. As to the distinction between φημί (to assert) and λέγω, compare on 1 Corinthians 10:15. What may have occasioned such slanders against the Christians? Certainly their non-observance of the Mosaic law, to which they ventured to deem themselves not bound, in order to gain eternal life by the grace of God through faith in the redemptive work of Christ, which was an offence to the Jews. The plural is not to be referred to Paul alone, which would be arbitrary on account of the preceding singular; the Christians are conceived as Pauline (comp Acts 21:21); and on the part of Jews and Judaizers (τινές, certain people, as in 1 Corinthians 15:12) are slanderously and falsely (for see Romans 5:20, Romans 6:1; Romans 6:15 ff.) accused of doing evil that good might come (might ensue as result). Under this general category, namely, the calumniators reduced the bearing of the Christians, so far as the latter, without regulating their conduct by the Mosaic law, were nevertheless assured, and professed, that they should through faith in Christ obtain the divine blessings of salvation. That general accusation was an injurious abstract inference thence deduced.

ὧν] i.e. of those, who follow this principle destructive of the whole moral order of God. They form the nearest logical subject. With just indignation the Apostle himself, having a deep sense of morality, makes us feel in conclusion by ὧν τὸ κρῖμα κ.τ.λ[763] how deserving of punishment is the consequence, which, if God be regarded as an unrighteous judge of the world, must ensue for moral conduct from the premiss that God is glorified by the sin of men. The reference of ὧν to the slanderers (Theodoret, Grotius, Tholuck, Mehring, Hofmann) is unsuitable, because it separates the weighty closing sentence from the argumentation itself, and makes it merely an accessory thought.

τὸ κρῖμα] The definite judicial sentence, decree of punishment at the last judgment.

ἜΝΔΙΚΟΝ] accordant with justice, rightful. Compare Hebrews 2:2. Frequently used in classic writers.

[756] Those who take ver. 7 f. as spoken in the person of the Gentile (see especially Reiche) explain the ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ of the true religion (how entirely opposed to ver. 4!), ψεύσματι of idolatry, and ἁμαρτωλός as Gentile.

[757] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[758] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[759] d refers to the note of the commentator or editor named on the particular passage.

[760] He brings forward the modal definition: ὡς ἁμαρτωλός as the main element; then the modality of the κρίνομαι opposed to this is καὶ μὴ καθὼς βλασφημ. κ.τ.λ.: “Why then am even I still judged like a sinner, and not rather according to that, which we are slanderously reported of, and which some affirm that we say: namely, according to this, Let us do evil, that good may come?” Instead of saying: καὶ μὴ ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά, Paul, in the indignation of excited feeling, gives to the thought which he had begun the different turn which it presents in the text. With this artificial interpretation, we must remember that Paul would have written καὶ οὐ instead of καὶ μή, since it is an objective relation that is here in question (compare Colossians 2:8 al.); that instead of καθώς we should have expected the repetition of the ὡς; and that the notion of κρίνειν, as it prevails in the connection (compare also the following τὸ κρῖμα), does not suit the assumed thought, ὡς ποιήσας τὰ ἀγαθά. Comp. also Morison, p. 79.

[761] l. and others; and other passages; and other editions.

[763] .τ.λ. καὶ τὰ λοιπά.Romans 3:7 f. These verses are extremely difficult, and are interpreted variously according to the force assigned to the τί ἔτι κἀγὼ of Romans 3:7. Who or what supplies the contrast to this emphatic “I also”? Some commentators, Gifford, for instance, find it in God, and God’s interest in the judgment. If my lie sets in relief the truth of God, and so magnifies His glory, is not that enough? Why, after God has had this satisfaction from my sin, “why further am I also on my side brought to judgment as a sinner?” It is a serious, if not a final objection to this, that it merely repeats the argument of Romans 3:5, which the Apostle has already refuted. Its very generality, too—for any man, as Gifford himself says, may thus protest against being judged,—lessens its relevance: for Paul is discussing not human evasions of God’s judgment, but Jewish objections to his previous arguments. Lipsius finds the contrast to κἀγὼ in the Gentile world. A Jew is the speaker, or at all events the Apostle speaks in the character of one: “if my unbelief does magnify His faithfulness, is not that all that is required? Why am I, too, like the rest of the world, whose relation to God is so different, and whose judgment is so necessary, still brought into judgment?” This would be legitimate enough, probably, if it were not for what follows. But the slander of Romans 3:8, which forms part of the same question as τί ἔτι κἀγὼ κ.τ.λ., and to which reference is made again in chap. Romans 6:1; Romans 6:15, had not the Jews, but the Apostle in his Christian character, for its object; hence it seems preferable to take the κἀγὼ as referring strictly to himself. That Paul would come into judgment, in spite of the fact that his faithlessness in becoming a Christian had only set off the faithfulness of God to Israel, no unbelieving Jew questioned: and Paul turns this conviction of theirs (with which, of course, he agrees, so far as it asserts that he will be judged) against themselves. If he, for his part, cannot evade judgment, on the ground that his sin (as they think it) has been a foil to God’s righteousness, no more can they on their part: they and he are in one position, and must be judged together: to condemn him is to expose themselves to condemnation; that is his point. The argument of Romans 3:7 is both an argumentum ad hominem and an argumentum ad rem: Paul borrows from his opponents the premises that he himself is to be judged as a sinner, and that his lie has set off God’s truth: there is enough in these premises to serve his purpose, which is to show that these two propositions which do not exclude each other in his case do not do so in their case either. But, of course, he would interpret the second in a very different way from them. The question is continued in Romans 3:8, though the construction is changed by the introduction of the parentheses with καθὼς and the attachment to λέγειν ὅτι of the clause which would naturally have gone with τί μή; If judgment could be evaded by sinning to the glory of God, so Paul argues, he and other Christians like him might naturally act on the principle which slander imputed to them—that of doing evil that good might come. No doubt the slander was of Jewish origin. The doctrine that righteousness is a gift of God, not to be won by works of law, but by faith in Jesus Christ, can always be misrepresented as immoral: “sin the more, it will only the more magnify grace” Paul does not stoop to discuss it. The judgment that comes on those who by such perversions of reason and conscience seek to evade all judgment is just. This is all he has to say.7. For if, &c.] Here St Paul takes up the Opponent on his own ground; speaking as a human being whose sin (e.g. a falsehood) serves to make God’s truth “abound to His glory;” i.e. be more largely manifest in a way to win Him fresh praise:—in such a case is not Paul, is not A, B, or C, equally entitled with the Jewish opponent to be excused penalty?—In the Gr. of the clause “why am I yet, &c.,” the word “I” is strongly emphatic; I also; i.e. “I, as well as my opponent.”—“Why am I yet, &c.:”—i.e. “after the recognition of the effect of my sin on the advancement of God’s glory.”—“By my lie;” lit. in my lie; i.e. “on occasion of it, in connexion with it.”Romans 3:7. Εἰ γὰρ, for if) An Ætiologia[34] [a sentiment, with the grounds on which it rests subjoined] set forth in the form of a dialogue, for the purpose of strengthening the objection which was introduced at the beginning of Romans 3:5. ψεύσματι, through my lie) The things which God says are true, and he who does not believe these, makes God a liar, being in reality himself the liar.—τί) that is, why do I even still excuse myself, as if I had some reason to fear? Comp. τί ἔτι, ch. Romans 9:19; Galatians 5:11.—κᾀγὼ) I also, to whom the truth of God has been revealed; not merely the heathen.—κρίνομαι) corresponds to κρίνεσθαι, Romans 3:4; Romans 3:6, LXX.; Job 2:9 (Job 40:4) τί ἔτι ἐγὼ κρίνομαι;

[34] See Appendix.Verse 7. - For if the truth of God in my lie abounded to his glory, why am I also still judged as a sinner? One view is that this is a continuation or resumption of the question of ver. 5 on the part of the Jew, its drift being the same. But the word κἀγὼ, as well as the position of the verse after τῶς κρινε1FC0;ι, etc., suggests rather its being intended to express that any one throughout the world, as well as the Jew, might plead against' deserved judgment, if the Jew's supposed plea were valid. Nay, in that case, the apostle goes on to say, he, or any of us, might justify all wrongdoing for a supposed good end. Why not? Lie (ψεύσματι)

Only here in the New Testament. The expression carries us back to Romans 3:4, and is general for moral falsehood, unfaithfulness to the claims of conscience and of God, especially with reference to the proffer of salvation through Christ.

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