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I. DUTY, CONSIDERED BARELY AS DUTY, DOES NOT CARRY IN IT A SUFFICIENT MOTIVE TO ENGAGE THE WILL OF MAN IN THE CONSTANT PRACTICE OF IT.

1. If in the soul of man its averseness to duty be much stronger than its inclination to it, then duty, considered barely in itself, is not sufficient to determine the will of man to the constant performance of it; which, in my judgment, is an argument so clear, that one of greater force cannot well be desired. No; sooner may the fire be attracted by the centre of the earth, or the vine clasp about the bramble, than any faculty of the soul have its inclinations drawn forth by a contrary and distasteful object. And then for the ground of this argument, to wit, that the soul has originally such an averseness to duty; this, I suppose, is but too evident to need any further probation.

2. The second reason, for the proof of the same truth, is this, that those affections and appetites of the soul, which have the strongest influence upon it, to incline and bias it in all its choices, to wit, the appetites belonging properly to the sensitive part of man's nature, are not at all moved or gratified by anything in duty, considered barely as duty, and therefore, as so considered, it is not a sufficient motive to induce men to the practice of it. Now this reason also, I conceive. carries its own evidence with it. For the soul of man, as the present state of nature is, generally moves as those forementioned appetites and affections shall incline it; and therefore, if that which thus inclines it be not some way or other first made sure of, all persuasions addressed immediately to the will itself, are like to find but a very cold reception.

3. The third and last reason that I shall allege is this: that if duty, considered barely in itself, ought to be the sole motive to duty, without any respect to a subsequent reward, then those two grand affections of hope and fear ought to have no influence upon men, so as to move or engage them to the acts of duty at all. The consequence is most clear; because the proper objects upon which these affections are to be employed are future rewards and future punishments; and therefore, if no regard ought to be had of these in matters of duty, it will follow, that neither must those affections, which are wholly conversant about rewards, have anything to do about duty, wherein no considerations of a reward ought, upon this principle, to take place. This, I say, would be the genuine, unavoidable consequence of this doctrine. But now, should any one venture to own such an odd and absurd paradox, in any of those sober, rational parts of Christendom, which have not depraved their judging and discerning faculties! For all the world acknowledges, that hope and fear are the two great handles by which the will of man is to be taken hold of, when we would either draw it to duty, or draw it off from sin. They are the strongest means to bring such things home to the will as are principally apt to move and work upon it. And the most renowned actions that were ever achieved upon the face of the earth, have first moved upon the spring of a projecting hope, carrying the mind above all present discouragements, by the prospect of some glorious and future good.

II. THE PROPOSAL OF A REWARD ON GOD'S PART, AND A RESPECT HAD TO IT ON MAN'S ARE UNDOUBTEDLY NECESSARY TO ENGAGE MEN IN A COURSE OF DUTY AND OBEDIENCE.

1. And first for the necessity of them.

(1) A thing may be said to be necessary when by the very essence or nature of it, it is such, that it implies in it a contradiction, and consequently an impossibility, even by the power of God Himself, that (the said nature continuing) it should be otherwise. And thus, I shall never presume to affirm (though some I know do) that God cannot induce a man (being a free agent) to a course of duty and obedience, without proposing a competent reward to such obedience.

(2) A thing may be said to be necessary, not absolutely, but with respect to that particular state and condition in which it is. And thus, because God has actually so cast the present condition of man as to make his inclination to good but imperfect, and during this life to continue it so, and withal to place him among such objects as are mightily apt to draw him off from what is morally good, it was necessary (upon the supposal of such a condition) that, if God would have men effectually choose good and avoid evil, He should suggest to them some further motives to good, and arguments against evil, than what the bare consideration of the things themselves prohibited or commanded by Him can afford. For otherwise, that which was morally good, meeting with so feeble an inclination in the will towards it, will never be able to make any prevailing impression upon that leading faculty. From all which you see, in what sense we affirm it necessary for God to propose rewards to men, thereby to engage them to their duty; namely, because of that imperfect estate which God has been pleased to leave men under in this world.

2. And now, in the next place, for the proof of this necessity.

(1) And first for Scripture. It has been more than sufficiently proved from thence already, how deplorably unable the heart of man is, not only to conquer, but even to contend with the difficulties of a spiritual course, without a steady view of such promises as may supply new life, spirit, and vigour to its obedience. To all which, let it suffice at present to add that full and notable declaration of St. Paul, in 1 Corinthians 15:19.

(2) The other proof of the same assertion shall be taken from the practice of all the noted lawgivers of the world; who have still found it necessary to back and fortify their laws with rewards and punishments; these being the very strength and sinew of the law, as the law itself is of government. No wise ruler ever yet ventured the peace of society upon the goodness of men's nature, or the virtuous inclination of their temper. Nor was anything truly great and extraordinary ever almost achieved, but in the strength of some reward every whit as great and extraordinary as the action which it carried a man out to. Thus it was in the virtue of Saul's high promises that David encountered Goliath. If we look further into the politics of the Greeks and the Romans, and other nations of remark in history, we shall find, that whensoever the laws enjoined anything harsh, and to the doing of which men were naturally averse, they always thought it requisite to add allurement to obligation, by declaring a noble recompense (possibly some large pension, or gainful office, or title of honour to the meritorious doers of whatsoever should be commanded them. For in vain do we think to find any man virtuous enough to be a law to himself, or any law strong enough to enforce and drive home its own obligation; or lastly, the prerogative of any lawgiver high enough to assure to him the subject's obedience. For men generally affect to be caressed and encouraged, and, as it were, bought to their duty (as well as from it too sometimes). For which and the like causes, when God, by Moses, had set before His own people a large number of the most excellent, and, as one would think, self-recommending precepts on the one hand, and a black roll of the very worst and vilest of sins on the other, sins that seemed to carry their punishment in their very commission; yet nevertheless in the issue God found it needful to bring up the rear of all with those decretory words in Deuteronomy 30:19.

(R. South, D. D.)

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KJV: Esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt: for he had respect unto the recompence of the reward.

WEB: accounting the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt; for he looked to the reward.