I were prescribing an end to marrying. Let them see to that, who, among the rest of their perversities, teach the disjoining of the "one flesh in twain;"  denying Him who, after borrowing the female from the male, recombined between themselves, in the matrimonial computation, the two bodies taken out of the consortship of the self-same material substance. In short, there is no place at all where we read that nuptials are prohibited; of course on the ground that they are "a good thing." What, however, is better than this "good," we learn from the apostle, who permits marrying indeed, but prefers abstinence; the former on account of the insidiousnesses of temptations, the latter on account of the straits of the times.  Now, by looking into the reason thus given for each proposition, it is easily discerned that the ground on which the power of marrying is conceded is necessity; but whatever necessity grants, she by her very nature depreciates. In fact, in that it is written, "To marry is better than to burn," what, pray, is the nature of this "good" which is (only) commended by comparison with "evil," so that the reason why "marrying" is more good is (merely) that "burning" is less? Nay, but how far better is it neither to marry nor to burn? Why, even in persecutions it is better to take advantage of the permission granted, and "flee from town to town,"  than, when apprehended and racked, to deny (the faith).  And therefore more blessed are they who have strength to depart (this life) in blessed confession of their testimony.  I may say, What is permitted is not good. For how stands the case? I must of necessity die (if I be apprehended and confess my faith.) If I think (that fate) deplorable, (then flight) is good; but if I have a fear of the thing which is permitted, (the permitted thing) has some suspicion attaching to the cause of its permission. But that which is "better" no one (ever) "permitted," as being undoubted, and manifest by its own inherent purity. There are some things which are not to be desired merely because they are not forbidden, albeit they are in a certain sense forbidden when other things are preferred to them; for the preference given to the higher things is a dissuasion from the lowest. A thing is not "good" merely because it is not "evil," nor is it "evil" merely because it is not "harmful."  Further: that which is fully "good" excels on this ground, that it is not only not harmful, but profitable into the bargain. For you are bound to prefer what is profitable to what is (merely) not harmful. For the first place is what every struggle aims at; the second has consolation attaching to it, but not victory. But if we listen to the apostle, forgetting what is behind, let us both strain after what is before,  and be followers after the better rewards. Thus, albeit he does not "cast a snare  upon us," he points out what tends to utility when he says, "The unmarried woman thinks on the things of the Lord, that both in body and spirit she may be holy; but the married is solicitous how to please her husband."  But he nowhere permits marriage in such a way as not rather to wish us to do our utmost in imitation of his own example. Happy the man who shall prove like Paul!
 "Jam hinc," i.e., apparently from the time of Christ's advent.  Matthew 19:5, 6.  Comp. de Idol., c. xxiii., and the note there on "se negant."  i.e., in martyrdom, on the ground of that open confession.  Non obest.  Philippians 3:13, 14.  Laqueum = brochon (1 Corinthians 7:35), "a noose," "lasso" ("snare," Eng. ver.). "Laqueo trahuntur inviti" (Bengel).  See note 13.
 Matthew 19:5, 6.
 Comp. de Idol., c. xxiii., and the note there on "se negant."
 i.e., in martyrdom, on the ground of that open confession.
 Non obest.
 Philippians 3:13, 14.
 Laqueum = brochon (1 Corinthians 7:35), "a noose," "lasso" ("snare," Eng. ver.). "Laqueo trahuntur inviti" (Bengel).
 See note 13.