He was also the first and only man that urged me to study the philosophy of the Greeks, and persuaded me by his own moral example both to hear and to hold by the doctrine of morals, while as yet I had by no means been won over to that, so far as other philosophers were concerned (I again acknowledge it), -- not rightly so, indeed, but unhappily, as I may say without exaggeration, for me. I did not, however, associate with many at first, but only with some few who professed to be teachers, though, in good sooth, they all established their philosophy only so far as words went. [222] This man, however, was the first that induced me to philosophize by his words, as he pointed the exhortation by deeds before he gave it in words, and did not merely recite well-studied sentences; nay, he did not deem it right to speak on the subject at all, but with a sincere mind, and one bent on striving ardently after the practical accomplishment of the things expressed, and he endeavoured all the while to show himself in character like the man whom he describes in his discourses as the person who shall lead a noble life, and he ever exhibited (in himself), I would say, the pattern of the wise man. But as our discourse at the outset proposed to deal with the truth, and not with vain-glorious language, [223] I shall not speak of him now as the exemplar of the wise man. And yet, if I chose to speak thus of him, I should not be far astray from the truth. [224] Nevertheless, I pass that by at present. I shall not speak of him as a perfect pattern, but as one who vehemently desires to imitate the perfect pattern, and strives after it with zeal and earnestness, even beyond the capacity of men, if I may so express myself; and who labours, moreover, also to make us, who are so different, [225] of like character with himself, not mere masters and apprehenders of the bald doctrines concerning the impulses of the soul, but masters and apprehenders of these impulses themselves. For he pressed [226] us on both to deed and to doctrine, and carried us along by that same view and method, [227] not merely into a small section of each virtue, but rather into the whole, if mayhap we were able to take it in. And he constrained us also, if I may so speak, to practise righteousness on the ground of the personal action of the soul itself, [228] which he persuaded us to study, drawing us off from the officious anxieties of life, and from the turbulence of the forum, and raising us to the nobler vocation of looking into ourselves, and dealing with the things that concern ourselves in truth. Now, that this is to practise righteousness, and that this is the true righteousness, some also of our ancient philosophers have asserted (expressing it as the personal action, I think), and have affirmed that this is more profitable for blessedness, both to the men themselves and to those who are with them, [229] if indeed it belongs to this virtue to recompense according to desert, and to assign to each his own. For what else could be supposed to be so proper to the soul? Or what could be so worthy of it, as to exercise a care over itself, not gazing outwards, or busying itself with alien matters, or, to speak shortly, doing the worst injustice to itself, but turning its attention inwardly upon itself, rendering its own due to itself, and acting thereby righteously? [230] To practise righteousness after this fashion, therefore, he impressed upon us, if I may so speak, by a sort of force. And he educated us to prudence none the less, -- teaching to be at home with ourselves, and to desire and endeavour to know ourselves, which indeed is the most excellent achievement of philosophy, the thing that is ascribed also to the most prophetic of spirits [231] as the highest argument of wisdom -- the precept, Know thyself. And that this is the genuine function of prudence, and that such is the heavenly prudence, is affirmed well by the ancients; for in this there is one virtue common to God and to man; while the soul is exercised in beholding itself as in a mirror, and reflects the divine mind in itself, if it is worthy of such a relation, and traces out a certain inexpressible method for the attaining of a kind of apotheosis. And in correspondence with this come also the virtues of temperance and fortitude: temperance, indeed, in conserving this very prudence which must be in the soul that knows itself, if that is ever its lot (for this temperance, again, surely means just a sound prudence): [232] and fortitude, in keeping stedfastly by all the duties [233] which have been spoken of, without falling away from them, either voluntarily or under any force, and in keeping and holding by all that has been laid down. For he teaches that this virtue acts also as a kind of preserver, maintainer, and guardian. Footnotes: [222] alla gar pasi mechri rhematon to philosophein stesasin. [223] The text is, all' epei aletheian hemin, ou kompseian epengeilato ho logos anothen. The Latin rendering is, sed quia veritatem nobis, non pompam et ornatum promisit oratio in exordio. [224] The text is, kaitoi ge eipein ethelon einai te alethes. Bengal takes the te as pleonastic, or as an error for the article, t' alethes. The einai in ethelon einai he takes to be the use of the infinitive which occurs in such phrases as ten proten einai, initio, hekon einai, libenter, to de nun einai, nunc vero, etc.; and, giving ethelon the sense of mellon, makes the whole = And yet I shall speak truth. [225] The text is, kai hemas heterous. The phrase may be, as it is given above, a delicate expression of difference, or it may perhaps be an elegant redundancy, like the French à nous autres. Others read, kai hemas kai heterous. [226] The reading in the text gives, ou logon enkrateis kai epistemonas ton peri hormon, ton de hormon auton; epi ta erga kai logous anchon, etc. Others would arrange the whole passage differently, thus: peri hormon, ton de hormon auton epi ta erga kai tous logous anchon. Kai, etc. Hence Sirmondus renders it, a motibus ipsis ad opera etiam sermones, reading also agon apparently. Rhodomanus gives, impulsionum ipsarum ad opera et verba ignavi et negligentes, reading evidently argon. Bengel solves the difficulty by taking the first clause as equivalent to ou logon enkrateis kai epiotemonas...auton ton hormon enkrateis kai epistemonas. We have adopted this as the most evident sense. Thus anchon is retained unchanged, and is taken as a parallel to the following participle epipheron, and as bearing, therefore, a meaning something like that of anankazon. See Bengel's note in Migne. [227] theoria. [228] dia ten idiopragian tes psuches, perhaps just "the private life." [229] heautois te kai tois prosiousin. [230] The text is, to pros heauten einai. Migne proposes either to read heautous, or to supply ten psuchen. [231] ho de kai daimonon to mantikotato anatithetai. [232] sophrosunen, soan tina phronesin, an etymological play. [233] epitedeusesin. |
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