Identity diffusion means that an individual has not developed significant values about life or held prominent vocational preferences (i.e., no commitment). Also, no crisis has been encountered.

Moratorium indicates that the individual has con­fronted a decision-making moment. Indeed, research shows that this person often tends to be churning in the middle of crisis. Consequently, the debilitating struggle (which may involve faith-defying experiences) "freezes" the young person. No major commitment can be secured.

Foreclosure. This is the flip side of Moratorium. It defines a state where beliefs and vocational decisions have been made, but they have come without any thought-provoking crises. For example, personal convictions here are based upon moral codes and opinions of outsiders (e.g., parents, church leaders, and other au­thority figures). Extrinsically-oriented values.

Finally, Identity and Achievement stands as Mar­cia's technical term for one who has "owned" personal values. Through the refining fire of crisis, genuine com­mitment is derived—intrinsic beliefs.

Adapting Marcia's research and terminology to the study of doubts, it would appear that substantial faith questioning primarily occurs in two of the four quadrants. "Moratorium" designates the spiritual condition of one wrestling with the beliefs--much like the unstable person portrayed by the apostle James: "a double-minded man." Their chaos is likened to a "wave of the sea, blown and tossed by the wind" (James 1:6-8, KJV). No wonder value commitment is nowhere to be found.

"Identity Achievement" typifies the second spiritual state in which doubts normally occur. In (.his case, how­ever, growth and stability reign. Struggling through doubts has paradoxically strengthened this individual. In fact, analogy can be drawn from James's opening com­ments, where a rather curious spiritual equation is intro­duced: "Consider it pure joy, my brothers, whenever you face trials of many kinds" (1:2), for trials test faith. Per­severance comes, and eventually maturity results (vv. 3- 4).

An earlier research project by Marcia verifies the basic faith-doubt implications cited above.38 At one point in his survey, the question was raised, "Have you ever had any doubts about your religious beliefs?" Represen­tative responses indicated cluster themes around each of Marcia's four categories, as the following samples suggest:

[Identity achievement] Yea, I even started won­dering whether or not there was a god. I've pretty much resolved that now, though. The way it seems to me is ...

[Moratorium] Yes, I guess I'm going through that now. I just don't see how there can he a god and yet so much evil in the world or ...

[Foreclosure] No, not really, our family is pretty much in agreement on these things.

[Identity diffusion] Oh, I don't know. I guess so. Everyone goes through some sort of state like that. But it really doesn't bother me much. I figure one's just as good as the other!

All port highlights al least a half-do/en instances where serious questioning of faith begins. First, reactive and negativistic doubt often surfaces when tragedies are encountered. The foxhole prayer that goes unanswered frequently results in militant atheism, souring any form of religious activity.

Second, extreme egocentrism (a relentless focus on self) often brings doubt with it. Childish expectations of faith in adulthood that are never fully resolved may cause an individual to "discard his conceptions and ter­minate once and for all his religious quest," Allport notes. Concerning the eventual outcome of this type of doubt, Allport adds, "A faith centered in self-advantage is bound to break up."39

Hypocrisy and failure within institutional religion in­duces a third form of doubt. In particular, doubt of this sort affects young people "who today seem supersensitive to the darker spots of religious history." For, even after bearing the standard excuses for the church's fail­ure, Allport reports, doubters are still not "persuaded by the counter-argument that crimes of persecution and big­otry are to be charged up to secularism and corruption rather than to the religious hypothesis in its purity."40

The fourth type of doubt parallels the seed (based upon the parable of the Sower) that falls upon the rocky soil and is ultimately choked of its faith-life. In the gospel story, initial joy may he compared with "religious striv­ings . . . the pursuit of meanings beyond the range of our intellectual capacity . . . the longing that, values be con­served."41

But as the seed's eventual demise results from shal­low soil, so doubt arises in this fourth case because the shallowness of its immature faith persists in retaining ju­venile perceptions of being dependent upon others. In contrast to this fourth doubt form, Allport observes that "when well-formed, the mature religious sentiment develops a driving power in its own right, motivating action, transforming character, and ordering sub-systems of be­lief and conduct."42

Fifth, doubts occur because of scientific or rational scrutiny. Allport contests that, in theory, the concept of an "open-minded scientist" (i.e., one who thinks exclu­sively in scientific and rationalistic structures) is merely an illusion. "In playing the game of science, a definite set of axioms must be adopted. They include, first and fore­most, the principle of determinism." "Identical happenings," he continues, "with identical histories, will have identical futures. There can be no intervention of Provi­dence, . . . The axiom of determination must always be held; otherwise the game of science, as now conceived, cannot be played."43 In other words, a world view that presupposes the superiority of scientific discovery and human reason (to the exclusion of supernatural reality) is potentially doomed to suffer doubt—since the glue that holds together life's puzzle has been discarded.

The sixth and last form of faith questioning that All-port suggests merely reflects a watered down version of the previous category—a generic brand of doubt, so to speak, for the nonprofessional "scientist." Typically this mind-set is claimed to be a natural, or realist, view of life. Allport describes its consequence as "the common­est mode of doubting."44

A young woman was sharing a few of her personal doubts with me, when I asked, "What advice would you give to a believer who was doubting?" Characterizing Allport's sixth category, she confidently stated, "Helax, God is in control." But. then, without pausing, she qualified her advice: "And if He's not, we're in the wrong business!" She demonstrated faith mingled with realistic questions.

Specifically, Allport notes that the strife in this final category comes when particular tenets of religious teach­ing are pilled against so-called acceptable standards of evidence. Traditional stumbling blocks in our twentieth century age of enlightenment, for instance, include the rejection of both a literal fiery hell and a heaven with golden streets, he states. Allport recommends that in such cases appropriate literary interpretation and contextualization are often overlooked by doubters, as he illustrates: "The Bible affirms, 'There is no God' but adds, 'says the fool in his heart.' Even the Fundamentalist must take the context into account."45

Why Does Doubt Occur?

The following section addresses the third divisional question (which may have causal significance) by using a trio of subtopics: (1) genetic factors affecting doubt, (2) genetic and environmental factors affecting doubt, and (3) specific reasons for doubt. Moving from general to more particular issues, (his section will catch a birds'-eye glimpse of human development theory as well as theories specifically confronting origins of religious doubt.

Genetic factors affecting doubt. When a compre­hensive meaning of the word doubt is stressed, many rel­evant theorists in the field of human development would claim that doubt naturally arises from within people. Likewise they would tend to argue that such predilection to doubt represents a singular--and inherited--component of holistic growth. That is, just as it is expected that certain physiological and psychological changes will oc­cur within every individual throughout all of life, the pro­cess of lifelong doubt, is recognized as one more natural phenomenon of human maturation. Also, just as individual distinctions are expected within other basic human growth patterns, wide-ranging experiences of doubt, are anticipated to differ from person to person.

Four areas of general human development must be considered as relevant to the subject of doubt.

1. Cognitive (or intellectual) development represents a foundational topic pertaining to faith and doubt formation. Jean Piaget, the famous Swiss-born psychologist, is said to have fashioned the modern-day approach to this discipline. Simply put, Piaget perceived that cognitive growth proceeds through a series of four stages; each new state is qualitatively distinct from the prior stage, as indicated below:
 

Stage 1: Sensory-motor intelligence (from 0 to 2 years of age)
The infant's intellectual condition is primarily dem­onstrated through behavioral ("motor") activity. This involves bodily movements and sensory expres­sions (e.g., touching, hearing, etc.).

Stage 2: Preoperational thought (2 to 7 years)
Language skills characterize this growth period. No longer restricted to behavioral motor activity, the young child becomes increasingly able to think (though in semi-logical patterns).

Stage 3: Concrete operations (7 to 11 years)
Logical and rational thinking distinguishes the early school-age child from his younger counterpart. He is limited to "concrete" (actual or real) applications of new-found skill—being unable to think hypothetically.

Stage 4: Formal operation!; (11 to 15 years)
Theoretically, the older child and young teen are ca­pable of moving beyond actual objects of thought to abstract objects. This ability to hypothesize allows them to contemplate life beyond the realm of their own experiences.46

Within all four of these stages, several complex pro­cesses of cognitive growth are operating. Five basic concepts, in particular, need to be understood to further comprehend Piagel's theory. Schema refers to the intel­lectual structures that people use to categorize life expe­riences according to common characteristics. For example, if a young child regularly calls all cats "dogs," perhaps his schema would reveal that both cab and dogs are perceived by him lo be friendly, furry, four-legged creatures. Adults, of course, would have more discerning schemata, based upon their latter stage development and personal experiences.

Assimilation defines the intellectual procedure whereby a person incorporates new perceptions into current, existing schemata. Using the illustration above, consider what might happen when the same child en­counters for the first time a caged lion at a zoo. If the child replies "dog" when he is asked the creature's name, that would indicate that his earlier schema has not been altered--simply one more animal has has been added to it.

Accommodation represents the cognitive process that recognizes that former, existing schemata no longer adequately classify and categorize life experiences. Two options are open here. Using the above case to illustrate, either the child will need (1) to create a new schema (for example, recognizing that the lion is anything I it friendly, he may create a new cognitive category of 'features that includes animals that are both unfriendly and large) or (2) to modify existing schemata in order to account for new experiences (for example, realizing that i le lion is unfriendly, the young child might reduce the characteristic of "dogs" to just furry and four-legged creatures). Both options are examples of accommodation.

Disequilibrium, the fourth of five basic concepts within cognitive studies, has particular significance for Piaget's theory and for the subject of doubt. When life experiences are not easily assimilated, they result in the tension of disequilibrium--an imbalance or instability of cognition. Barry J. Wadsworth, one of the interpreters of Piaget, concludes that "disequilibrium (a prob­lem), always leads to active efforts to assimilate and accommodate. Disequilibrium is Piaget's primary ex­planatory concept of motivation."47

It may already be apparent to the reader how dis­equilibrium thus relates to the matter of doubt. As in the area of cognitive growth, disequilibrium may produce doubt, since it is necessary to regularly reassess current perceptions and beliefs about life. An example would be the first time a young Christian teen encounters the view that God really does not exist. That experience--what may or may not be a traumatic one--will motivate him to confront his cognitive (and faith) imbalance.

Equilibrium identifies a balance between assimilation and accommodation processes. Such a balance is necessary because neither extreme is healthy, too much assimilation (with little or no accommodation) would yield a few—but very large—schemata, since similarity is stressed, whereas too much accommodation (with little or no assimilation) would bring about a cumbersome number of very minute schemata, since dissimilarity is emphasized. The weakness of the former would be a person's inability to discern or differentiate his particular experiences, and the weakness of the latter would be the inability to group his experiences by common, larger cat­egories of reality.

2. The second area of maturity--affective (or emo­tional) development--should not be so disconnected with cognitive growth that a dualistic view of people is gener­ated; yet emotional development does represent a dis­crete domain of the human maturational process that must be considered separately regarding faith and doubt formation. Emotion, just like intellect, has the potential to contribute to total human growth. Likewise both have the capacity to elicit nonproductive (or counterproduc­tive) consequences for growth. For instance, one study shows that two major types of cognitive-emotional misdi­rection have been identified in children. Such experi­ences in childhood often yield fearful and anxious results—doubt being just one.48 The first type has been called "errors of inference," further defined as "predictions or conclusions that falsely represent reality."49 Several illogical processes (including overgeneralization) prompt this condition. One example would be for a child who has re­cently lost his pet bird in death to conclude, "God must not like me very much."

The second type of cognitive-emotional misdirection incorporates two parts: "ego anxiety," or worry pertaining to one's self (e.g., "I must do well in the Sunday school contest, so my teacher will think I really love Jesus"); and "discomfort anxiety," or worry pertaining to the notion that only personal discomfort is threatening (e.g., "It would ho just awful if I lost the Sunday school contest").50

But children are certainly not the only people who are controlled by such cognitive-emotional misdirection. Helfaer refers to one of his clients who was suffering from doubt through an exhibition of this identical behavior:
 

He gives reality a very specific interpretation and un­critically suspends an openness to the possibility of other interpretations. On occasion he explicitly insists on his own interpretation regardless of an awareness of evidence that might contradict it. . . .That is, the feeling of tightness about a belief is accepted, without further criticism, as an indication of the truth of that belief. . . . The feeling of truth and reality, are higher-criteria for belief than the critical evaluation of reason. In this way faith is projected from intellectual doubt and reality-testing in general.51

In some ways, these demonstrations of emotional one-sidedness reflect the opposite human condition of the earlier-described condition of extreme scientific rationalism.

3. Moral development (from certain angles, an ex­tension of the two previous areas of human growth, especially cognitive theory) has been brought to the public's attention largely due to the research of Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg. His theory, like Piaget's, stresses se­quential, hierarchical stages of development. In fact, since his research focuses more upon the rationale that people offer for their actions (vs. their actual moral be­havior itself), the link with cognitive theory is extremely significant. An overview of Kohlberg's theory below re­veals his three primary levels, each of which contains two stages.

"Preconventional" level--At this first, juncture of mor­al maturity, the individual responds to cultural rules which are enforced by those who exercise physical power. Specifically, the focus of attention is "self," since the person is motivated by what will reduce per­sonal punishment and gain personal reward.

Stage 1: "Punishment and obedience orientation"--The physical results of behavior determine its goodness or badness. Being "good" characterizes avoidance of punishment ms well as positive recognition for accomplishment.

Stage 2: "Instrumental relativist orientation"--Needs of others are given token attention, since moral behav­ior is somewhat reciprocal—but only by using the stan­dard "you scratch my hack and I'll scratch yours."

"Conventional" level--The focus of attention and the source of motivation shifts from self to "others." The range of this others-orientation spans from family to friends to society.

Stage 3: "Good boy-nice girl orientation"--Goodness is now determined by a series of "informal" rules, whereby others are pleased or helped through personal behavior, and thus, they offer their approval.

Stage 4: "Law and order orientation"--More "formal" laws define morality (e.g., performing one's national or civic duty).

"Postconventional" level--Moral values based upon "principles"--apart from personal gain or group conformity—frame the distinction of this final level.

Stage 5: "Social-contract, legalistic orientation"--Right behavior tends to be based upon general individual rights which society has established. Procedural rules are sought through group consensus.

Stage 6: "Universal ethical principle orientation"--Self-ascribed ethical principles (based upon conscience) form the primary focus. Further emphasis centers upon a lifestyle congruent with such principles. Abstractness of moral code (e.g., the Golden Rule) is favored over concreteness (e.g., the Ten Commandments).52

Through a brief analysis, it may become apparent that several cross-references In the subject of doubt are potentially expressed in Kohlberg's theory. For instance, reconsider the three primary foci of each distinct level above (i.e., a focus on self, others, and principles, respectively). At the first level, the existence of Clod might be questioned by individuals when their mechanical and egocentric view of faith is not consistently satisfied (e.g., when the false dictum "Good people should never suffer" is violated). At the second level, God's love may be doubted when an individual is treated disloyally by a trusted family member or good friend. Al the third level, disillusionment with Clod's divine order may occur either when faith is lost in the consensus process or when an individual experiences the turmoil of conflicting principles within the conscience.

4. Faith or spiritual development covers a broadly defined area of human growth, not simply the traditional topics of the Judeo-Christian heritage. James W. Fowler of Emory University stands as one of the prominent leaders in this field. Like Kohlberg, Fowler's position reveals definite ties with Piaget's cognitive theory, yet warrants a distinctive discipline all its own."53

Perhaps one of the most intriguing illustrations of Fowler's allegiance with cognitive-philosophical systems comes from his reference to the potential faith struggle that children have when they enter Piaget's first growth stage. (In review, the last cognitive stage is formal opera­tions, often commencing in the preteen years; it provides the capacity to hypothesize—to mentally play with the abstract world of thought.) Referring to the older child's newly acclaimed ability to reorganize his perception of faith, Fowler comments, "This construction frequently gives way during a phase we have come to call eleven-year-old atheism" (emphasis added).54 Such questioning of their earlier-perceived notions of God must, again, be partially understood within the context of their cognitive, emotional, and social maturation, as Fowler further explains:
 

This phase comes when thoughtful children whose re­ligious and social environments have given them suffi­cient emotional space to question and reckon for themselves begin to come to terms with the fact that ours is not a "quick-pay-off universe." The good do not always get rewarded; the wicked are not always punished.55

By way of critiquing Fowler's explanation, someone might be quick to conclude, "If the environment that allowed the child to question his dissonant perceptions had been absent, the reassessment of the child's tradi­tional faith would not have occurred." Although this may initially look like an accurate observation, it is actually shortsighted; for it must be fully stressed that research indicates such an environmental void would have merely meant postponement of--not escape from--inevitable faith struggles later in life. In the case of such postpone­ment, faith development tends to be dwarfed by other areas of human growth--on imbalance that may produce devastating consequences, as Fowler observes:
 

In fact, we see a fair number of persons--usually men --who may exhibit considerable cognitive sophistica­tion in their occupational worlds (as physicians or en­gineers, for example) bill who in their emotional and faith lives are rather rigidly embedded in the struc­tures of Mythic-Literal faith and imperial selfhood. To their marriages and family life they bring a rigidity--often coupled with authoritarian patterns--that in­flicts psychic and sometimes physical violence on their partners and children. It often leads them to a kind of baffled bereftness in their forties and fifties, when in the shambles of their shattered families, for the first time they may begin the painful task of learning about the interior lives of selves--starting with their own.56

Helfaer, in his own studies on doubt, verifies this noteworthy find of Fowler's. Selecting one man from his research who particularly failed to mature in his child-hood faith, Helfaer outlines grievous patterns of doubt that were subsequently suffered in adulthood.
 

The old faith, the earlier religious sublimations, could not possibly do the psychological work needed to con­tain these inner and miter threats. Since it could not provide the protection of faith, it was doubted. It is possible that the inner tension that precipitated his conversion when he was eight was the same form of anxiety that later became expressed, first in his early teens.57

Later in his text, Helfaer offers further insight into this specific case study: "The inability to re-evaluate the world view of childhood and the childhood premises upon which conflicts were resolved and the sense of self established may he considered a form of doubt."58

These findings within the faith development research once again address the complexity and interrelated features of human growth. In particular, doubts--too long relegated to isolated tidbits of religious life--have now been documented to permeate all avenues of human existence: how we think, how we feel about ourselves, how we relate to others, and how we resolve the conflict of perceptual dissonance represent but a few correlations with faith struggles. The issue, then, becomes not so much whether to confront doubt, but when to address it, as Fowler summarizes, "At thirteen, when it comes much more naturally and painlessly, or at fifty-throe, when it comes out of the agony of broken relationships."59

Texas Tech's Mark 0. Webb offers a helpful perspective at this point, since he readily acknowledges par­allels between faith development and other domains of human growth. But he also cautions against overlooking dissimilarities. For example, Webb likens doubt to "an internal warning" system, observing that one common motivation of mankind is somehow to maintain a state of equilibrium. (Thus, the correlated theories of Piaget, Festinger, and others provide invaluable resources.) However, Webb refuses to neglect doubt's peculiar con­dition. He contrasts what he calls religious experience and "normal doubt-resolution," which, he says, includes questions arising from secular and scientific investiga­tions. Webb submits that the latter category of question­ing permits objective evidence to be gathered and a choice between two alternatives to be made, whereas the former category, he claims, does not permit such convenience of scientific evaluation, given the nature of faith.

This dualistic distinction seems somewhat contrived. Nothing is mentioned, for instance, of the subjec­tive presumptions of scientific methods and tasks earlier noted by Allport. Nevertheless, Webb's contribution here arises from his insight that religious doubt does pose a particular problem, since oftentimes the core is­sue of religious doubt "is not subject to normal empirical modes of inquiry."60 Ranging far beyond such restrictive forms of scientific investigation, metaphysical questions (concerning the reality of a personal God and His handiwork) typically lie at the base of faith questioning. Webb concludes: "No method of resolving the doubt presents itself, since these things cannot be investigated by looking at the world. Consequently, the doubt remains, grow­ing in intensity over time." Recalling that an equilibrated human condition is naturally sought, Webb observes that "a radical readjustment of the whole belief system takes place under the pressure of persistent doubt. That is why we have intense religious experiences, but only rarely do we have intense scientific experiences."61

Genetic and environmental factors affecting doubt. Building upon this single influence of heredity, many developmental theorists directly or indirectly agree with the assertion that "doubt" naturally arises from the com­bination of inherited traits, self-percept ion and social interaction. Erik II. Erikson perhaps best represents a prominent figure who values these complementary factors of personal and environmental features. Consequently, a brief summary of Erikson's theory will be presented--especially emphasizing his theory's first half, which dis­cusses children and youth. Ramifications will be drawn for the subject of doubt.

First, it is important to note that Erikson modifies and expands Sigmund Freud's five stages of psychosexual theory, in offering his eight stages of psychosocial theory. In further contrast to Freud (who primarily concentrated on birth through adolescence) Erikson pos­tulates a life-span view for the total age range of human growth. Erikson believes that individuals develop healthily when particular life challenges of each stage are suc­cessfully negotiated. In order to value the dynamics of life, each of his eight stages is intentionally framed by a set of polarities (or tensions) highlighting particular life challenges. Also, based upon his research, Erikson includes a synthesizing virtue for every one of his stages. Erikson's theory of eight stages is presented below through a sequencing of four major periods of life.62

1. Early childhood. Erikson's first stage pitted the tension of "Trust versus Mistrust" (from birth to approx­imately eighteen months). Here, the infant is challenged by the need to trust others when private needs (e.g., hun­ger) are met. Conversely, distrust results when uncertainty and anxiety arise, as private needs go unattended. Erikson further describes the negative side of this stage as "that 'double take' which we call doubt--doubt in himself and doubt in the firmness and perspicacity of his trainers."63 The virtue that is anticipated in the resolu­tion of this tension is a new condition called "hope."

Stage 2 (from eighteen months to three years of age) highlights the challenge of "Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt." Positive resolution of this tension should yield self-worth and the virtue of "will," as the child's environ­ment supports self-insistence. Erikson rephrases this po­larity as a struggle "between self-expression and compulsive self-restraint or meek compliance. . . . From an unavoidable sense of loss of self-control and of parental over control comes a lasting propensity for doubt and shame."64 Implications for religious doubt can be project­ed from Erikson's additional commentary on self assessment: "This basic sense of doubt... is the model for the habitual 'double take' or other later and more verbal forms of compulsive doubting."65

"Initiative versus Guilt" designates the third stage of psychosocial theory, incorporating ages three to six. The focus is on creating and instigating individual activities, leading to virtues of "purpose" and accomplishment. Fear of punishment or guilt stands at the opposite pole and is experienced as the young child is overcome by po­tential failure (even perceived failure) from such self-initiated activities.

2. School-age childhood. As the young child enters school, the start of Erikson's fourth stage, two major changes are experienced within a matter of years. First, a radical shift in social activities occurs. Prior to school age, peer interaction—particularly in larger groups—was minimal (excluding preschool or daycare experiences). During school age, approximately one-half of the child's waking hours are spent with other small children. This shift in social interaction will be challenged by the ideas, needs, and demands of his peers. Wadsworth summarizes: "Social behavior, by its very nature, is an important source of disequilibrium, doming to look al something from another's viewpoint, questioning one's reasoning, and seeking validation from others are all essentially acts of accommodation."66

The age-relevant need here, among others, is to seek recognition and approval of others (for the first, time on a broader scale). In fact, in simple terms, the re­search that discovered this need led Erikson to the con­clusion that children proceed with self-evaluation (who they are), based upon self-accomplishment (what (hey do). He officially labels this fourth stage "Industry versus Inferiority," for six-year olds up through the start of pu­berty. Industry translates into comprehending the value of work as well as the attainment of technological skills.

Positive self-images, therefore, are constructed when schoolchildren feel good about the social support they receive for individual achievement. Conversely, they sense inferior attitudes when they experience self-defeating frustration and failure in their work. "Compe­tence" is the intended virtue of resolution in this fourth stage crisis.

Besides the radical shift in the degree of social inter­action, the second major change in school-age children comes as they develop the ability to think logically and rationally (Piaget's third of four stages). Contrasting their earlier preschool cognitive competencies, Chandler notes,

So long as meanings were imagined to he features of objects rather than subjects, it was easy enough to suppose that the facts would remain the same regardless of who was in the business of collecting them. As meanings come to be understood as mental products that are actively manufactured rather than harvested as natural resources, however, the idea of absolute truth is emptied of much of its earlier significance, and the companion notion of objectivity deteriorates [em­phasis added].67

In other words, certain specific doubts will arise in the school-age child simply because of the cognitive movement from semi-logical to logical thinking. (That is precisely what had happened to my daughter Melissa, in the introductory story about her personal doubts.) Chan­dler has stated that this doubting process may have snowballing consequences. Using quite a vivid illustra­tion, he concludes: "The effect of pulling on this small thread of insight is to eventually unravel the whole epistemic [i.e., nature of knowing] fabric of middle child­hood."68

3. Adolescence. The potential for destructive, self-critical thinking continues when puberty is reached. Erikson calls this "a transitory total self-doubt."69 One hopeful sign and recent finding for this period, however, may in­dicate that, such self-doubt decreases as "adolescents be­come increasingly certain of the traits and characteristics they attribute to themselves. [It involves] a gradual consolidation of self-evaluations."70 Regardless, doubt does advance to a new challenge, for young teenagers typically move into Piaget's fourth and final stage of formal opera­tions (i.e., the ability to think abstractly and hypothesize). At (he same (hue, they have entered Erikson's fifth stage, "Identify versus Hole Confusion"--the stage holding "fidelity" as its anticipated virtue in resolution. That is, as the early teen begins to understand who he or she is, the teen continues to experiment with a variety of potential roles in order to fine tune identity. If psychosocial pressures and demands override a positive comprehen­sion of self-in-the-world, confusion and despair reign in the teen years. Chandler depicts the multi-faceted strug­gles of adolescence in this manner:

The price of all this new-found uncertainly is generic doubt, not the kind of mundane, case-specific doubt of middle childhood, but a wholesale, transcendental kind of doubt that threatens to annihilate the whole of one's system of beliefs. . . . What are novel to I he adolescent period are those more unassuageable, universal doubts that have their roots in the remote con­jectural possibility of hypothetical error. . . . Discover­ing some route around this impasse, some means of recovering an acceptable epistemological footing in an essentially uncertain world, it would be argued, is a primary developmental task of the adolescent period.71

This "generic doubt" is elsewhere described as the "recognition of the universality of subjectivity,"72 and for conservative Christians a totally relative world view is neither acceptable nor reassuring, Employing a horribly graphic metaphor for this age period, Chandler defines such cognitive (and faith) turmoil as a time when "ac­quired knowledge is the epistemological equivalent of a bullet in the brain."73 To make matters worse, Chandler adds that his studies reveal that normative, adolescent reaction to these stressful times yields one of two out­comes: "either a blind dogmatic faith or a know-nothing skepticism."74 Certainly, more than those two options ex­ist, but Chandler's summative remarks, nevertheless, provide a startling commentary of youth who are overwhelmed by doubt.

4. Adulthood. Particularly recounting the second stage of "Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt," Erikson observes that adult faith questioning will be influenced by the degree of successful stage negotiation during early childhood maturation. Developmentally stated, Erikson asserts that the child's potential for "this basic sense of doubt. . . finds its adult expression in paranoiac fears."75 For the believer, Helfaer provides a helpful correlation between Erikson's theory and spiritual development, saying that "basic mistrust, shame and doubt, arid guilt can all be given symbolic expression in the terms of reli­gious belief."76 An additional example of this connected­ness includes the fact that one of the underlying themes of Erikson's research on Martin Luther was that (lie Re­former's attempt to assess mid affirm his own faith was based upon his experienced trust in early infancy."

In brief, the three adult psychosocial stages of Erikson are: Stage 6, "Intimacy versus Isolation," when younger adults seek serious commitments with others or withdraw socially, becoming self-absorbed; Stage 7, "Generativity versus Stagnation," where middle adults attempt to care for the next generation or continue in further forms of isolation, through self-indulgence; and Stage 8, "Ego Integrity versus Despair," as older adults review and accept their life accomplishments or become depressed and anxious over disapproving self-evalua­tions of life (virtues include "love," "care," and "wisdom," respectively). To follow through on the comparison Helfaer made, during any one of these three adult stages the potential for storing up or breaking down faith is possible.

Specific reasons for doubt. The third of three subtopics that confront the issue, Why does doubt occur? fo­cuses on more particular matters of religious doubt (over against the generic doubt of the human condition).

A handful of studies have been conducted among those who suffer from religious doubt. From preliminary glances at such research, there exists no rhyme or reason for the causal source of spiritually disenchanted persons. For example, in Helfaer's studies alone, just a few of the complementary influences associated with doubt range from low self-esteem78 to a lack of repentance,79 and from the specific pressures of seminary training80 to diverse personality orientations toward faith and doubt.81 The safest conclusion to draw seems to be that we can identify correlations with doubt. We cannot be as certain about cause-effect formulas.

Maintaining a sensitivity for these findings, five broad categories were synthesized from religious literature as a response to the query, "Why?" These categories are not meant to be exhaustive but instead to be representative of doubt's possible origins (acknowledging that the "chicken or egg" controversy may be legitimately raised for each of these five categories).

1. Unstable home life. Several researchers have suggested that an unhealthy home environment contrib­utes to potential doubt among its family membership.82 Allport offers one overarching evaluation of home condi­tions, as it pertains to faith struggles:

If, as Freud has said, the religious sentiment is at bottom as an extension of one's attitude toward one's physical father, then we would expect repressed animosity toward this father on occasion to be reflected in a hatred of religion. . . . Probably the truest statement would be that on occasion—probably not often--both belief and doubt may reflect unconsciously one's atti­tude toward one's parent.83

Helfaer's studies affirm evidence of counterproduc­tive home life in his research on doubt. Specifically, In­dies an example of one doubter's immature mother, who regularly expressed strong jealousy toward the father.84 Moreover, Helfaer states that the irresponsible behavior of this doubter's father, in part, precipitated religious questioning in the son.85 To complicate an already unsta­ble parental situation, this doubter confesses that his family was uprooted and moved forty times!86

Consider the broader issue of related emotional and psychological trauma arising from the home life. Albert Ellis and Michael Bernard note that whereas it is a myth that "parents are always to blame" for their children's maladjusted condition, "it appears that parents as role models and reinforcing-punishing agents play a major part in preventing, minimizing, or exacerbating emotional and behavioral problems in their children."87 In this context, Russell M. Grieger and John D. Boyd point out a dozen faulty parenting styles that tend to promote emo­tional-behavioral problems in their children.88

2. Unhealthy religious character. Certain studies show that one significant element of religious life con­trasts individuals possessing extrinsic orientation (that is, people who believe because of social group expectations and/or external reward) with those motivated by intrinsic orientation (that is, people who believe because of personal conviction, regardless of external influence). Using this factor, research indicates that usually individ­uals who are extrinsically motivated are significantly more prejudiced and rigid in their belief system than the intrinsically motivated.89 In a similar vein, it appears that individuals who are dominated by an external locus of control (that is, they favor the authority and viewpoints of particular people over their own) typically cling to more irrational beliefs than individuals characterized by an internal locus of control.90

Using three standardized testing scales, it was discov­ered also "that a person who endorses irrational beliefs will tend to be dogmatic and also (end to he religious for reasons of social support and external reinforcement."91 Of these two components (that is, dogmatism and extrinsic religious orientation), dogmatism was found to be "nearly twice as important in predicting" irrationality when compared to the combination of these two com­ponents.'" In this light, Chandler researched adolescents who were "especially susceptible to dogmatic conver­sion"'1' and noted comparisons between their faith strug­gles and their newfound cognitive capacity to hypothesize (as well as to doubt). Chandler summarizes his findings by saying that one of his more provocative discoveries was that "such dogmatic views are parasitic upon doubt and carry skepticism as their secret shar­er."94 In short, dogmatism and extrinsically oriented faith simply set people up for an imminent ambush with doubt.

Francis Bacon summarizes this truism when he observes: "If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts; he shall end in certainties."

3. Extreme personality types. Additional research indicates that certain kinds of persons may be more prone to faith questioning than other individuals. A sampling of two of those personality types are discussed below.

"Low-Integration" and "High-Integration" types re­fer to the extreme cognitive capacities to assimilate and/or accommodate life experiences. In studies conducted by Schroder, Driver, and Steufert, a quartet of cognitive levels were discovered,95 including the following:

1. Low Complexity Integration—The category for people with mutually-restrictive, black-and-white categories of perception. Here, absolute descriptions such as "all" or "none" are often used to explain life.

2. Moderate Complexity Integration—The category representing "a movement away from absolutism.... Because of the availability of alternate schemata, 'right' and 'wrong' are not [as] fixed."96 "Black and white" views of life are not as acceptable.

3. Moderately High Complexity--Persons possessing the ability to "vary combinations of alternate schemata. A person ... can simultaneously weigh the effects of taking different views."97 By way of comparison, this third category of life perceptions demonstrates less frequent compartmentalizations of reality.

4. High Complexity Individuals who typically use "alternate complex combinations [to] provide the potential for relating and comparing different systems of interacting variables [and] the possi­bility of highly abstract function."98 In other words, there is both the ability and the desire on the part of these persons to value paradoxes in life.

It appears that for those associated with either of the above two extreme categories, potential for doubt would be greatest. In the first extreme, the categorical "either or" mind-set would be often challenged to recon­sider more complex perceptions of reality. Conversely, in the last extreme, the inability to distinguish discrete, cog­nitive classifications may cause opposite disturbances of doubt—expressed by a call for precision and order and the absence of ambiguity. (A parallel could be drawn be­tween these two extremes and the earlier-noted cogni­tive extremes contrasting "accommodation only" versus "assimilation only" thinking.)

A classic, prime suspect for doubt is the personality type known as the "Perfectionist" (technically described as an "obsessive-compulsive" individual). Of this person­ality, Freud once observed, "Another mental need, which is also shared by obsessional neurotics ... is the need for uncertainty in their life, or for doubt."'1" Freud proceeded to distinguish the perfectionist as one having a self-fulfilling predilection for failure, because they "turn their thoughts by preference to those subjects upon which all mankind are uncertain and upon which our knowledge and judgments must necessarily remain open to doubt."100

Erikson's studies likewise led him to encounter the potentially dysfunctional state of perfectionism. Tracing the origin of this mental condition to his theory's early second stage ("Autonomy versus Shame and Doubt"), Erikson brands the maladjustment as a "precocious conscience."101 Through further elaboration of such an in­fant's disposition, he suggests that
 

instead of willfully appropriating things in order to test them by repetitive play, he will become obsessed by his own repetitiveness and will want to have everything "just so," and only in a given sequence and tempo. By such infantile obsessiveness and procrastination, or by becoming a stickler for ritualistic repetitions, the child then learns to gain power over his parents. . . . Such hollow victory, then, is the infantile model for an adult compulsion neurosis.102

Clinical psychologist James R. Beck claims that this pathological personality type often breeds "extensive doubt, fear, and/or relentless rumination."103 Moreover, Beck shows that this condition may reside within nonbelievers and believers alike. On the one hand, Beck shows that the obsessive-compulsive, nonreligious individual may be compared to the person who has a nagging sensation that he may have violated a tax law. His fear of impending arrest plagues him. Concerning more philosophical mat­ters, this type of person may also suffer despair from fears revolving around topics of death and the nature of evil.104

On the other hand, Beck suggests that the Christian who experiences this unsettling condition may, for exam­ple, be continually struggling with a Bible passage that "causes him or her to question status with God and spiritual position and place in the future."105 Doubting one's conversion experience or questioning whether or not a particular sin has nullified his salvation are quite typical anxieties for this individual.

4. Psychological factors. Webb posits that all "religious experiences fall neatly into two categories."106 The first (his "Type A") contains experiences that are unex­pected and unprovoked by the individual in question. Saul and his Damascus Road conversion would typify this category. The second ("Type B") incorporates all those who actively seek religious enlightenment. The very na­ture of this latter category, Webb contends, often corre­lates with certain intentional alterations in biochemical or physical conditions. Drug abuse (even some types of incense), for example, expresses one of the most blatant, causal factors for physiological as well as religious expe­riential change. Irrespective of his overly simplified di­chotomy, Webb still offers believers a sobering word of insight. For his research indicates that less extreme faith practices--even fasting and meditation--are also report­ed to contribute directly to questioning of faith. Webb convincingly warns that "causing an unusual biochemical state may bring about a change of outlook which can in­duce doubt."107

5. Life events. The Gallup survey mentioned earlier reveals that there are specific experiences that impact faith—times when reappraisals of personal belief are often made. The four life events affecting faith determined to be the most frequently cited by respondents include: (1) experiencing the death of a loved one (86 percent), (2) receiving a promotion or honor on the job (08 per­cent), (8) having a baby (either as a mother or Hit her; 65 percent), and (4) having a "born again" conversion (31 percent).108 It is significant to note that actual experience of such a life event (determined by the respondent's re­ply of either a simple yes or no) is distinguished from the degrees of influence it had in the individual's life (that is, the respondent's choice between being affected "a great deal, some, or not at all"). Consequently, a second set of complementary statistics should be considered. Eighty percent of those who had a "born again" conversion (again, 31 percent of the total respondents) claim that this experience affected them a "great deal"--the highest percentage in the cate­gory of "degree" among this quartet of life events.109 Of that 80-percent figure, 84 percent of the women and 75 percent of the men (yielding a composite of 80 percent) claim that they were greatly affected by their conversion.110

Seventy-two percent of those who had a baby claim "a great deal" of impact regarding their reassessment of life's purpose. Fifty-eight percent of those experiencing the loss of a loved one identify the experience as having the highest level of impact, and only 24 percent say that their vocational promotion or honor affected their faith reappraisal to the same degree.111

"How?"
Potential Cures For Doubt

Several avenues of counsel may be pursued when attempting to minister to the doubter struggling with faith. The following half dozen suggestions represent just a few of the possible remedies, not meant to stand as iso­lated pieces of advice for cure. In fact an intentional inte­gration of ideas has been sought, and, for this reason, a selection of insights from both Christian and secular sources were chosen for their therapeutic benefits.

Change Misunderstandings About Faith and Doubt

Generally, doubt has been defined as the antithesis of faith, but that is clearly not the truth. As many believ­ers would acknowledge, Towns claims, "I have never met an honest and sincere Christian who has not experienced doubt."112 Yet something can be said for the confusion that arises, because there are so many misconceptions about faith and doubt. In light of this condition, Creel of­fers three "noetic perversions of faith." (The word noetic originates from the Greek nous, meaning mind; consequently, Creel refers to the cognitive or intellectual mis­understandings of faith. Without altering Creel's inten­tions, one could easily expand his topic to read "noetic perversions of faith and doubt").

First is the perversion of dogmatism. "Dogmatism, I am com hired, is the attitude of those who cannot live with the ambiguity of human experience--or who don't see the ambiguity (and not seeing it may be a function of not wanting to see it)."113 As a follow-up to Towns' testimony, Creel summarizes his studies: "Most of these Christians wanted to believe with all of their hearts, but unanswered questions plague them."114

Believers often suffer from one particular root of dogmatism: the tension found in theological paradoxes--two truths that seem to be contradictory but actually coexist, much like parallel rails on a train track. A para­doxical example in Scripture would be Philippians 2:12-13: "Continue to work out your salvation with fear and trem­bling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to His good purpose." Here, Paul claims that individual Christians and God Himself are both responsi­ble to pursue the ongoing tasks of salvation. That does not mean that man earns his salvation in any way. But it does point out that regeneration is not an "either/or" matter (that is, God or man) but a "both/and" reality. A person who is overly dogmatic cannot handle this tension and ambiguity. Such a person often suffers from doubt, trying to package Scripture into neat little boxes that never seem to fit.

Perhaps it was this understanding of dogmatism that led the skeptic Voltaire to write, "Doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainly is an absurd one."

Next, Creel identifies the intellectual perversion of exclusiveness, explaining to his readers in the second person, "You don't take seriously what the person says who disagrees with you; you only try to figure out how lo convert him. If he proves impervious to your appeals and arguments, then you avoid him."115 In Luke 9:49-50 Jesus rebukes His beloved disciple John, who had earlier re­strained someone from casting out a demon. The Lord saw that John's rationale for his restraining actions ("be­cause he is not one of us") was extremely selfish and my­opic. Jesus much prefers a far broader category of just two types of people: those "for us" and those "against us." It is fairly easy to see how exclusivistic thinking leads to doubts and false guilt (that is, guilt that comes from man's standards of living, not God's).

Third, Creel points out the perversion of coercion: "the willingness to use propaganda or force to make people commit themselves, or at least, say that they are committing themselves, to a certain religious position, whether it be theistic, such as Christianity, or atheistic, such as communism."116 Implications for doubt are self-evident for this perversion, since coercion fosters an un­healthy and unstable state of commitment--to say nothing of the warped ethics involved.

Again, the Lord's example is instructive here. In Mark 6:1-6, Jesus returns to His homeland, seeking to minister to family and friends. Upon their rejection of Him, the Lord proclaims the now-famous dictum "A prophet is not without honor but in his own country" (v. 4, KJV). In addition, Mark records that the Son of God was limited to healing just "a few sick people" (v. 5) and that "he was amazed at their lack of faith" (v. 6).

The point is foundational: even though this home­town crowd probably included several relatives and friends, Christ refused to manipulate their faith. In fact, His public ministry was quite severely restricted because Jesus affirmed man's freedom to choose or reject Him. His commendable response to Jewish abuse heaped on Him personifies what is recorded of God the Father in Psalm 78:41 concerning the identical, sinful rejection by the Old Testament forefathers: "Again and again they put God to the test and vexed the Holy One of Israel."

Emphasize Healthy Thinking

Broadening the first suggested remedy for doubt, re­sults in the second recommended task of comprehensive mental fitness. In secular psychological theory, one prominent example of this remedy is called Rational-Emotive Therapy (R.E.T.). The founder of this theory, Albert Ellis, Executive Director of the Institute of R. E. T. in New York City, describes this discipline of cognitive con­trol by articulating its overriding aims:

The main subgoals of RET consist of helping people to think morn rationally (scientifically, clearly, flexibly); to fed morn appropriately; and to act more functionally (efficiently, undefeatingly) in order to achieve their goals of Jiving longer and more happily.117

By way of appropriation, Salzman employs R. E. T. techniques when he suggests that the obsessive-compul­sive individual must "acknowledge that anxiety is univer­sal and omnipresent and cannot be permanently elimi­nated from life. This means abandoning attempts at per­fection and superhuman performance."118

Now, it is fair to say (hat the application of R. E. T. in a Christian context is highly controversial--not the least problem of which stems from the fact that the founder confesses to be an avowed atheist.119 However, moder­ates in the controversy churn (hat the helpful truths pres­ent, within R. E. T. can be therapeutic if they are carefully reinterpreted within the Christian context.120 For in­stance, Lawrence and Huber report, that in one particu­lar case scriptural truth could be intricately linked to R. E. T.'s intentional approach of realistic thinking:

Jane was encouraged to memorize the Bible verses and use them as "instant disputations" when she found herself resorting to her old irrational beliefs about her­ self. She also incorporated them into her use of the disputation procedure she learned, something which she practiced at least 10 minutes per day in order to maintain and improve her emotional well-being.121

Perhaps one of the clearest demonstrations of the integration between Christian counsel and a modified version of R. E. T. was published in the best seller Telling Yourself the Truth, by William Backus and Marie Chapian (Bethany Fellowship, 1980).

CHECK AUTHORITARIANISM

Whether in the home or in the church, authoritarian leadership inherently dominates its followers, partially causing the "noetic perversions of faith" that Creel de­scribes. As was shown, coercive techniques were not popu­lar with Jesus, nor are they shown to be productive for healthy human development. Piaget, for example, lashes out at such forms of manipulation because of particular research findings:

It is . . . absurd and even immoral to wish lo impose upon the child a fully worked-out system of discipline when the social life of children themselves if sufficiently developed to give; rise to a discipline infinitely nearer to the inner submission which is the model of adult morality. It is idle ... to try arid transform the child's mind from outside, when his own taste for active research and his desire for cooperation suffice to ensure a normal intellectual development. The adult must therefore be a collaborator and not a master.122

Wadsworth updates Piaget's discoveries and offers summary advice for parents and teachers who desire to work with--not against--the God-given nature and pal-terns of a child's growth.

If the goals of education (at home and in school) include the development of sound moral reasoning, co­operation, and autonomy, and if we agree with Piaget's views, we can conclude that the authoritarian model for the relationship between children and adults is a poor one. If children develop moral judgment, cooper­ation, and self-discipline in an authoritarian environ­ment, it is in spite of, not as a result of, their authoritarian relationship with adults.123

Of course, these insights must not be confined to parent-child or teacher-child relationships. Adult ties (such as those between pastor and parishioner) yield the same payoffs. Consequently, all coercive forms of leadership must be rethought and recast into enabling, collaborative ministries.

ENCOURAGE SCRUTINY OF FAITH

A twenty-year-old student I know had this to say about using doubt productively: "Use the time of doubts to explore your faith. [Use it] as a time for growing stron­ger in your faith and knowing what you believe, and why."

Contrary to what might be expected, personal beliefs need to be reassessed from time to time. Only a fairy tale view of faith claims that doubts will not surface if--like a hornet's nest--faith remains undisturbed. Based upon earlier statements of faith and doubt, it is not so much whether faith will be scrutinized (for it will) but how faith will be critiqued. Nurturing leaders of the faith, then, must provide a supportive atmosphere where beliefs can be examined. To this end, Allport offers timely insight to the Christian community. Referring to children who suffer from inadequate guidance during periods of faith questioning, he states:

Only a child who is assisted in revising his imagery and his theology to accommodate the day-by-day increase in experience could escape the surge of doubt. Conceivably the parent and the church school might do a better job than they do in assisting the child over the successive collisions of belief and experience, and in helping him identify religion with a positive altitude toward life rather than with immature images and interests.124

Moreover, McKenzie calls attention to a trio of spe­cific tasks that perpetuate a careful scrutiny of faith. First, religious roots must be explored to enable the individual to appreciate his heritage and provide a frame­work for his beliefs. Next, religious tradition must be expanded by adapting it to personal life experiences. Without accomplishing this task, heritage becomes irrelevant. Finally--and most important in McKenzie's mind--believers need assistance in the faith-critique process. The author reasons, "If the unexamined life is not worth living, neither is the unexamined faith. ... It is only by means of critical reflection on and evaluation of one's religious commitment that faith becomes truly personal and more than a mere submission to religious convention."125

What is required demands more than mere lecturing about religious catechism. Far beyond prescribed re­ligious instruction, careful scrutiny involves instructional movement over and above formal sets of questions put to growing believers. Rather, honest dialogue with learners meets the challenge of relevant, sometimes impromptu, concerns. Also, unlike most catechetical instruction, the careful scrutiny of faith must involve adults as well as children. Again, McKenzie provides meaningful suggestions concerning such an adult ministry. Along with his contemporary assessment, he offers a word of caution to the church:

It should not be forgotten, however, that the critical appraisal of meaning structures is a process that is mi integral part of many adult lives. We cannot effectively forbid adults to he critical. . . . Critical inquiry need not be adversarial, mean-spirited, or filled with the hubris that characterizes contemporary agnostic scientism. Critical inquiry can be undertaken constructively or destructively. It is the task of the religious educator to help adults understand this difference.126

Perry Downs of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School echoes the sentiments of McKenzie. Specifically address­ing his insights to ministry with adolescents, Downs suggests that the church can serve its doubting youth in three ways. First, a nurturing "context" must be established, or young people might, seek alternate avenues to express their faith questions. "The provision of this context is not as much a matter of program as it is one of at­ titude"127--an emphatic "I've been there before, myself" attitude. The attitude demonstrates that raising faith questions is not atypical. ,

Second, concrete answers must be given to at least some of the questions of doubt that are raised. Downs calls for youth staff to have a working knowledge of apol­ogetics (a rational defense of Christianity) geared to the level of adolescent development. Youth need not only "the security of knowing that others have raised these questions" but the assurance "that satisfactory answers are available."128

Finally, Downs stresses the point that those who deal with adolescents

must provide for [them] a true Christian experience. ... If the youth group is a place . . . where the presence of God is fell, the teenager has a basis beyond the intellectual to believe. This would not be very helpful to the doubting adult, but it is quite powerful for the adolescent.129

Indeed, the strongest statement that Downs makes to this end of assisting youth through their doubts comes as he concludes that "each of the major theorists who deal with the ministry questions that are related to faith development support these strategies."130 (Among the theorists which Downs had earlier critiqued included James Fowler and John Westerhoff.)

Reinforcing several of these factors pertinent to faith scrutiny comes a vibrant personal testimony by one of the daughters of the late Francis Schaeffer. When Susan Schaeffer Macauley was eleven years old, she experienced a run-in with doubt that she never forgot. (Remember Fowler's "eleven-year-old atheism"?) More significantly, she had a subsequent run-in with her father even more unforgettable.

Picking weeds one day in the family garden with her two sisters, Debby and Priscilla, Susan started thinking aloud concerning her faith. In their hot, tired, and crabby condition, tempers flared over theological themes. Finally, one of the sisters challenged Susan, saying that her faith questioning illustrated a poor Christian testimony to villagers passing by.

"Well, I'm not a Christian anyone!" Susan retorted. "I don't believe any of it!"

Needless to say, the dramatic reaction of shocked silence was even more than the preteen intended or imagined.

That momentous scene repeated itself inside Su­san's young head all afternoon, like a videotape set on automatic rewind and playback. Following the initial shock to even her own system, the questions just would not cease. What did she really believe?

Susan was convinced that her public denial would soon be raised again by her sisters. It was just a matter of time and place. Suspense was short-lived.

At the supper table, Priscilla announced, "Susan says she isn't a Christian."

By then I didn't feel like denying her words, even though I could see that my mother looked sad. I was sad, too, for I felt as if I had lost God and His love. I wasn't sure that there even was a God.

But I was also determined. I couldn't believe in fairy tales! I had to grow up.

That easily could have been my last day of knowing God was there, and that I was sale in the order lie had provided. It could have been the death of my faith.

Or it could have been the end of my progress into thinking as an adult. All it would have taken was a comment like, "Of course you're a Christian, Susan," or, "You're only eleven; you don't know what you're saying, " or, "Don't be foolish--it's obvious that the Bible is true."

But something else happened instead. That night when I was ready for bed, alone and quiet in my room, my father came in.

"Let's talk, Susan," he said seriously. "Tell me why you said you are no longer a Christian."

I confessed that I'd first said the words because I was mad. "But as soon as I said it, I was scared." I explained. "I can't call myself a Christian! All this time, I've only believed it because you and mother told me about it. Now I'll have to wait and see if it's true or not. Maybe the other religions are true. Or maybe there isn't even a God at all!"

There was a moment of silence. I still remember the quiet, friendly companionship in the atmosphere when my dad finally answered me. "Susan," he said, "those are good questions. I'm glad you've asked them."

What a relief! That dizzy, lonely feeling left me. It was OK to ask questions! It was important for me to rind out for myself if what I'd believed was true.

As we talked that night, I discovered that my dad had asked these same questions about God in his own search for answers. Dad opened the door for me into a new adventure. He said that I didn't have to go through life with a blindfold on my mind to believe in God, merely clinging to hopes and feelings. Neither did I have to throw my beliefs out the window.

If something is true, he explained, you can look at it hard, and think about it, and compare it with other beliefs, and it will stand. It will be reliable.

I decided to do just that.131

RESPECT CHOICE AND OWNERSHIP

Closely affiliated with the subject of scrutiny is free­dom of choice. As individuals investigate what it is that they believe (as opposed to what they are told to be­lieve), caring leadership would do well to value and encourage personal faith ownership. Substantial research indicates that the twin process of self-evaluation and in­dividual affirmation not only possess inherent and immediate virtue but provide necessary innovation for the perseverance of future faith. To this end, respected psychologist David Elkind, elaborating on Piaget's theory, suggests that "it is the child who must, at any given point in time, choose the method of learning and materials that are reinforcing to him."132 Addressing the negative di­mension of this educational premise, Elkind continues, "Without the opportunity for student choice and the provision of large blocks of time, in which the child can total­ly engross himself in an activity, the values of intrinsic motivation will not be realized."133

Wadsworth refers to this matter of choice and selec­tion as "spontaneous interest"--unique reflections of in­dividual preference, often accompanying signs of personal disequilibrium.134 It simply boils down to the fact that everybody prizes participation in areas of per­sonal choice. And faith is no exception. When we "buy into" the ownership of our faith, it is immensely stronger than an inherited--or surrogate--faith.

The apostle Paul speaks of the value of faith owner­ship, using such synonyms as personal conscience and conviction. In Romans 14, rather than winning popularity votes by judging certain cultural controversies as either good or bad, Paul prefers to lay down principles whereby believers can "agree to disagree" with one another. The most prominent principle to surface from this approach is the imperative of personal faith ownership. The apos­tle challenges individual members of his mature Roman congregation to continually ask themselves, "What is it that I really believe?" and then to live by those heartfelt convictions. Three principles stand out: (1) "Each man should be fully convinced in his own mind" (v. 5); (2) "I am fully convinced that no food is unclean in itself. But if anyone regards something as unclean, then for him it is unclean" (v. 14); and (3) "But the man who has doubts [i.e., who does not have the personal conviction] is condemned if he eats, because his eating is not from faith [or conviction]; and everything that does not come from faith [or conviction] is sin" (v. 23).135

UTILIZE SOURCES OF SUPPORT

Analogous to the planned rehearsal of fire drill pro­cedures in a public facility, research shows that most people tend to have a game plan when private faith is questioned. Doubt "escape exits"--so to speak--include ii combination of personal, interpersonal, and supernatu­ral sources. The 1985 Gallup survey uncovers various forms of those game plans as interviewers raised the question, "When you are faced with a problem or crisis, like those in the previous question [i.e., the "life events" noted earlier], to which of the following kinds of support would you likely turn for help?" The question was then supplemented by nine suggestions from the research staff.136 Though limited by the convergent-type format of those nine areas of support, the answers of the respon­dents were balanced. Most people chose interpersonal forms of support: 87 percent, say they would seek refuge for their faith struggles within their family, and 73 percent state they would share their problem with close friends. A far lower number claim they would go to a re­ligious counselor (40 percent), see another type of pro­fessional counselor (31 percent), or discuss the matter with a support group (26 percent) or a religious class (23 percent).

One young man recently told me how an assistant dean at his college inadvertently dropped in to see him only minutes before he intentionally planned to commit suicide by drug overdose. This is how he told his story:

God intervened [and] brought my Assistant. Dean into my room to just say "Hi" and give me a hug. That was all it took to make me realize that God wanted me to stay alive and that. He really would help me with the pain and confusion [of doubt] inside. ... A big factor a listening ear, empathy, comfort and acceptance of me and my feelings.

Many students have communicated with me how invaluable the interpersonal form of support really is--a nonnegotiable factor for most who mention this theme. On the negative side, one middle-aged woman recalled her doubting experience from eleven years ago. She confided, "No one helped. I quit church for a couple of years."

On a more positive note, a younger woman offered this testimony: "During my mother's illness and death, family struggles, and breakup of a personal friendship, the family that I lived with just listened to me, loved me, and continually affirmed that 'God is good find what Ho does is good.'"

A twenty-nine-year-old man chimed in: "I saw someone loved me, just as I am--someone showed that he saw some value in me."

Just to keep us "church professionals" humble, an­other young man spoke of his salvation six years ago, with ensuing doubts: "[In looking back] I was amazed to see how little influence counselors, pastors, and leaders seemed to have had in my life regarding major deci­sions. ... I never met a 'professional Christian.'"

A high percentage responded that they would opt for supernatural assistance: 80 percent testified that they would pray about their faith struggle, and 64 percent said that they would rend the Bible or other inspirational literature. (Comparing subgroups, it was found I hat 87 percent of nonwhite respondents as opposed to 61 percent of white respondents made the latter choice.)

Also, as much as 80 percent admitted lo valuing a personal form of support, for example, to working out the problem on their own.137

Summary

Numerous statements have been offered concerning the nature of faith and doubt. Some of the more salient conclusions of this particular overview have been the fol­lowing: Questioning faith is a worldwide human phenomenon; it is not restricted to religious or nonreligious persons. Doubt should be viewed from the larger perspective of holistic development; cognitive, emotional, social, and spiritual growth all play a part in the com­plete picture of maturation. There are different types of doubt, some forms of which may be highly beneficial for faith formation. Because of its genetic (and generic) na­ture, doubt surfaces within people of all age groups; however, because of its multifaceted nature, it must be addressed as a unique, case-specific activity. Also, the Christian home, church, and school need to produce more knowledgeable and sensitive leaders who will ably assist its membership during difficult times of doubt.

In conclusion, Leon McKenzie's earlier quotation deserves reconsideration, for it succinctly capsulates the truth-kernel of Christian doubt and what can be done about it:

We come into the world with question marks in our heads. . . . The question marks in our heads are never fully erased. The religious educator, particularly the religious educator of adults, can help learners in the quest that is mandated by a seeking faith. . . . We can­not effectively forbid adults to be critical. Willy-nilly, many adults will subject their childhood beliefs to critical analysis in spite of exhortations to the contrary. Further, it is better to help adults appraise religious tradition from within the confines of the church than lo fail by default and allow them to critique religious teachings outside the context of the church.138

Endnotes--Appendix

1. G. W. Allport. The Individual and His Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 113.
2. Faith Development and Your Ministry (Princeton, N.J.: (Gallup, I986). p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. Ibid. p. 9.
5. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid., p. 21.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Early Latin Theology, vol. 5 of Library of Christian Classics, trans. and ed. S. L. Greenslade (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1956). p. 38.
9. Leon McKenzie, "The Purpose and Scope of Adult Religious Education," in Handbook of Adult Religious Education, ed. Nancy Foltz. (Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education, 1986). p. 11.
10. Michael Chandler, "The Othello Effect: Essay on the Emergence and Eclipse of Skeptical Doubt," in Human Development 30 (1987): 138.
11. Philip M. Helfaer, The Psychology of Religious Doubt (Boston: Beacon, 1972), p. 11.
12. Allport, p. 83.
13. Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology (New York: Holt. Rinehart & Winston, 1963). p. 131.
14. Hugh D. Alien, "Doubt as Discontinuity in Religious Life," M.A. thesis, Vanderbilt, Nashville, 1968, p. 1.
15. Elmer L. Towns, "The Ministry of Doubt," The Evangelical Beacon, Sep­tember 28, 1965, p. 6.
16. Barth, p. 123.
17. Allport, p. 114.
18. Towns, p. 6.
19. Philip Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum," in Curriculum Theorizing, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1975), p. 331.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Alien, p. 40.
23. M. Jamie Ferreira, Doubt and Religious Commitment (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1980), p. 3.
24. Helfaer, p. 307.
25. Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper, 1957). p. 22.
26. Paul Tillich. Systematic Theology (Chicago: U. of Chit-ago Press. 1957), 2:73.116.
27. Roger Trigg, Reason and Commitment (Cambridge. England: Cambridge U. Press. 1973), p. 46.
28. See Richard E. Creel, Religion and Doubt (Englewood Cliffs. N. .1.: Prentice-Hall. 1977). p. 82.
29. Towns, p. 7.
30. Creel, p. 70.
31. Ibid., p. 71.
32. Ibid., p. 72.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Faith Development and Your Ministry, p. 23.
36. Ibid., p. 24.
37. See James E. Marcia's "Identity in Adolescence," in J. Adelson, ed., Handbook of Adolescent Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1980).
38. James E. Marcia, "Development and Validation of Ego-Identity Status," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 3, no. 5 (1966):551 -58.
39. Allport, p. 120.
40. Ibid., p. 121.
41. Ibid., pp. 122-23.
42. Ibid., p. 124.
43. Ibid., p. 131.
44. Ibid., p. 133.
45. Ibid., p. 135.
46. See Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence in Children (New York: Inter­national Universities, 1963).
47. Barry J. Wadsworth, Piaget for the Classroom Teacher (New York: Long­mans, 1978), p. 146. See also Leon Festinger's complementary view of dis­equilibrium in his A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford U. Press, 1962), especially his summary on p. 260.
48. See Russell M. Grieger and John D. Boyd, "Childhood Anxieties, Fears, and Phobias," in Rational-Emotive Approaches to the Problems of Child­hood, ed. Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard (New York: Plenum, 1983).
49. Ibid., p. 222.
50. See pp. 223 27 in Grieger and Boyd.
51. Helfaer, p. 163.
52. See Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education," in Moral Development. ... It Comes with the Territo­ry, ed. David Purpel and Kevin Ryan (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1976), pp. 215-16. Later revisions of Kohlberg's research tend to modify Stage 6 or delete it altogether.
53. See Fowler's Stages of Faith: The Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981). Especially note chap. 13. "Structural-Developmental Theories and Faith." This chap­ter is designed to summarize contributions Fowler has gleaned from other theories, but it also—in Fowler's own words—points out "some of the lim­itations of their approaches for our project and says some things about how we are trying to correct or go beyond these limits" (p. 98).
54. James W. Fowler, Faith Development and Pastoral Care (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), p. 86.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Helfaer, p. 126.
58. Ibid., p. 304.
59. Fowler, Faith Development and Pastoral Care, pp. 86-87.
60. Mark 0. Webb, "Religious Experience as Doubt Resolution." Interna­tional Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1985): 83.
61. Ibid., pp. 83-84.
62. See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York: Norton, 1963).
63. Erik H. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (New York: Norton, 1968). p. 110.
64. Ibid., p. 109.
65. Ibid., p. 112.
66. Barry J. Wadsworth, Piagel's Theory of Cognitive tind Affective Develop­ment, 3d ed. (New York: Longmans, 1984), p. 116.
67. Chandler, p. 150.
68. Ibid.
69. Erikson. Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 112.
70. Stephen R. Shirk. "Self Doubt in Late Childhood and Early Adolescence," Journal of Youth and Adolescence 16, no. 1 (1987): 66.
71. Chandler, p. 150.
72. See B. Inhelder and J. Piaget. The Growth of Logical Thinking (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1958).
73. Chandler, p. 146.
74. Ibid., p. 142.
75. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 112.
76. Helfaer, p. 8.
77. See Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton. 1958).
78. Helfaer. pp. 125-26.
79. Ibid., pp. 106-7.
80. Ibid., pp. 29-31.
81. Ibid., pp. 16-17; 24-25; 52-56.
82. To state this same category in a positive manner, Jeffrey Hadden and Robert Evans have demonstrated that students who come from more religiously active homes tend to continue that religious activity in college. See their article "Some Correlates of Religious Participation Among College Freshmen," Religious Education 60 (July-August I9*>r>". p. 284. Also, Joseph Havens found that students with stronger religious back­grounds tend to have fewer severe conflicts in their Faith. See his article "The Changing Climate of Research on the College Student and His Religion," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 3 (I all 1963): 59.
83. Helfaer, p. 118.
84. Ibid., p. 109.
85. Ibid., pp. 126,220-21.
86. Ibid., p. 109.
87. Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard, "An Overview of Rational Emotive Approaches to the Problems of Childhood," in Rational-Emotive Approaches to the Problems of Childhood, ed. Albert Ellis and Michael E. Bernard (New York: Plenum, 1983), p. 23.
88. Grieger and Boyd, pp. 220-22.
89. See G. W. Allport and J. Ross, "Personal Orientation and Prejudice," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 5 (1967): 432-43. Also see J. Feagin, "Prejudice and Religious Types: A Focused Study of Southern Fundamentalism," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 4 (1964): 3-13.
90. R. U. Martin, C. McDonald, and L. F. Shepel, "Locus of Control and Two Measures of Irrational Beliefs," Psychological Reports 39 (1970): 307-10.
91. Louis H. Prirnavera, John Tantillo, and Theresa DeLisio. "Religious Ori­entation, Religious Behavior, and Dogmatism as Correlates of Irrational Beliefs," Rational Living 15, no. 2:37.
92. Ibid., pp. 30-37.
93. Chandler, p. 154.
94. Ibid.
95. Shroder, Driver, and Streufert, Human Information Processing (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967).
96. Ibid., p. 19.
97. Ibid.. p. 23.
98. Ibid., p. 22.
99. Sigmund Freud, "Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis," Second Edition 10 (1909): 232.
100. Ibid.
101. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 111.
102. Ibid.
103. James R. Beck, "Treatment of Spiritual Doubt Among Obsessing Evangelicals," Journal of Psychology and Theology 9, no. 3 (Fall 1981): 225.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Webb, p. 81.
107. Ibid., p. 84.
108. Faith Development and Your Ministry, p. 27.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid., p. 39.
111. Ibid., p. 27.
112. Towns, p.6.
113. Creel, p. 86.
114. Towns, p. 6.
115. Creel, p. 86.
116. Ibid., p. 87.
117. Albert Fllis and Michael K. Bernard, "What Is Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET)?" in Clinical Applications of Rational-Emotive Therapy, ed. Albert Hllis and Michael F,. Bernard (New York: Plenum, 1985). p. 5.
118. L. Salzman, The Obsessive Personality: Origins, Dynamics, and Therapy (New York: Science House, 1908), p. 267.
119. Constance Lawrence and Charles H. Huber, "Strange Bedfellows?: Rational-Emotive Therapy and Pastoral Counseling," The Personnel and Guidance Journal, December 1982, p. 210. See also Ben N. Ard, Jr., "Nothing's Uglier Than Sin," Rational Living 2, no. 1: 4-0. Also Richard L. Wessler, "A Bridge Too Far: Incompatibilities of Rational-Emotive Therapy and Pastoral Counseling," The Personnel and Guidance Journal. January 1984. pp. 264-66.
120. See "Comparisons: Christianity and Rationality," by Paul A. Hauck and F. Grau. Rational Living 3, no. 2: 30-37.
121. Lawrence and Hubcr, p. 212.
122. J. Piaget. The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: Free Press. 1965), p. 404.
123 Barry J. Wadsworth, Piaget's Theory of Cognitive and Effective Development. 3d ed. (White Plains, N. Y.: Longman, 1984). pp. J92-93.
124. Allport, p. 115.
125. McKenzie, p. 12. 120. Ibid.
127. Perry G. Downs, "Faith Shaping: Bringing Youth to Spiritual Maturity," in The Complete Book of Youth Ministry, ed. Warren S. Benson and Mark H. Senter III (Chicago: Moody, 1987). p. 57.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Susan Schaaffer Macauley, How to Be Your Own Selfish Pig (Elgin. III.: Cook, 1984), pp. 13-18.
132. David Elkind, "Two Approaches to Intelligence: Piagetian and Psychometric," in Measurement and Piaget, ed. P. Green, M. lord, and G. Mam-er (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), p. 25.
133. Ibid.
134. Sec Wadsworth's Piaget for the Classroom Teacher.
135. Of course, the apostle Paul also balanced the truth about faith ownership with the theological tension of submission to fellow believers who might be offended by certain self-selected practices in the church. See Ronald T. Habermas, "Gray Matters," Christianity Today (August 7, 1987). pp. 23 25.
136. Faith Development and Your Ministry, p. 29.
137. Ibid.
138. McKenzie, pp. 11-12.